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Abstract
Agenor studies the links between macroeconomic  cross-country  regressions linking various macroeconomic
adjustment and poverty. First, he summarizes some of  and structural  variables to poverty. The author finds that
the recent evidence  on poverty  in the developing world.  output growth and real exchange rate depreciations  tend
Second,  he reviews  the various channels  through which  to lower poverty,  while illiteracy,  income inequality,  and
macroeconomic  policies affect the poor. Third, Agenor  macroeconomic  volatility tend to increase  poverty. In
emphasizes the role of the labor market.  He develops an  addition,  the impact of growth  on poverty appears to  be
analytical  framework that captures some of the main  asymmetric,  and to result  from a significant relationship
features of the urban  labor market in developing  between  episodes of increasing poverty and negative
countries  and studies the effects of fiscal adjustment on  growth rates.
wages,  employment,  and poverty. Fourth, he presents
This paper-a product of the Economic Policy and Poverty Reduction  Division, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger
effort in the institute to analyze the impact of adjustment programs on poverty and income distribution. Copies of the paper
are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Maria Gosiengfiao,
roomJ4-282, telephone 202-473-3363,  fax 202-676-9810, email address mgosiengfiao@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
pagenor@worldbank.org.  February 2002.  (82 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work  in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the Research  Advisory StaffMacroeconomic  Adjustment  and the Poor:
Analytical  Issues and Cross-Country  Evidence
Pierre-Richard  Agenor*
The World  Bank
Washington  DC 20433,  USA
JEL Classification  Numbers:  F41,  J31,  J64
*This  paper  dwells  on  some  of  my  recent  work  on  labor  market  segmentation  and
asymmetric  shocks.  I am  grateful  to  Nihal  Bayraktar  for  excellent  research  assistance.1  Introduction
Understanding and assessing the poverty and distributional effects  of macro-
economic adjustment  programs remain issues of considerable importance for
economists and policymakers  alike.  A key reason for this is the growing  ev-
idence that  economic  and financial  crises  hurt the poor most,  because they
often  lack  the  means  to protect  themselves  from  adverse  income  and em-
ployment  shocks.  The poor lack assets  (such as bank deposits or land)  and
often have  no direct  access  to credit  markets (or face  prohibitive borrowing
costs  when  they  do),  to smooth the  impact  of these  shocks.  For  the very
poor, unfavorable shocks may be large enough to result in actual declines in
consumption,  bringing it down below subsistence  levels and exerting a detri-
mental effect on their longer term nutrition and health prospects.  Moreover,
due to the lack of education  and marketable  skills,  the poor tend to be less
mobile  (across  sectors  and  regions)  than better-educated  workers  and  are
therefore often unable to switch jobs and capitalize  on available employment
opportunities.  Finally, indirect  sources  of income and public transfers other
than unemployment  benefits may decline  during crises,  because during such
episodes the ability of relatives  (or local communities)  to engage  in resource
sharing and income redistribution may be reduced, whereas governments may
be forced to adjust drastically their fiscal accounts with across-the-board cuts
in expenditure.
There  is also growing  recognition  of the fact  that assessing  the benefits
and costs of adjustment  programs may entail dynamic trade-offs. In partic-
ular,  it is now well recognized  that the large budgetary cuts that have been
associated  in  some  cases  with stabilization  efforts  have  fallen  to  a signifi-
cant extent on transfers to households  and other types of social expenditure,
thereby  worsening  the plight of lower-income  groups  in the short term.  At
the same time,  however, it is also well understood  that these groups tend to
be the ones most  adversely  affected by  high inflation,  credit rationing,  and
excessively  high interest rates, in part because of the effect of these variables
on private sector activity and employment.  To the extent that fiscal austerity
leads to a durable  reduction in the rate of inflation,  higher credit to private
firms,  and to lower  borrowing rates,  the poor  may benefit from government
spending cuts in the  longer run.  It is therefore  important  to carefully  eval-
uate the  net benefits  (in present  value  terms)  that  such trade-offs  entail  in
designing adjustment  programs.
Despite the importance of these issues,  however, the evidence examining
2the impact of adjustment  programs  (and  macroeconomic  policies in partic-
ular) on  the poor remains  relatively  limited.  Various country-  (or  region-)
specific studies  have  been  published  in recent years,  but they  often remain
highly  descriptive  when  it  comes  to  assessing  the effect  of macroeconomic
and  other structural  variables  on  poverty.  In  addition,  although  it is  well
recognized  that the poor often generate  a sizable share of their income from
wage employment,  the role of the labor market in the transmission of macro-
economic  policy  shocks  to lower-income  groups  (particularly  those located
in the urban sector) has not been fully  explored in analytical  and empirical
models.  Understanding  this  role is  all the more  important  given the pecu-
liarities and imperfections  (which often result from government  intervention)
that often characterize  the labor market in developing  countries.
The present  study attempts to contribute to the current  debate at three
levels.  First,  it provides  an  analytical  overview  of the various transmission
channels  of macroeconomic  policy  to the poor,  dwelling  in the process  on
the  most recent analytical  and empirical  literature  in this area.  Second,  it
provides a formal  analysis of the role of the labor market in the transmission
of policy shocks  to the urban  poor, taking  into account  the type of distor-
tions often observed in the developing world.  Although the model is used to
examine only the effect of a particular shock, it is sufficiently general to serve
a variety of purposes.  Third, it provides  some new,  quantitative evidence on
the effect of macroeconomic  factors on poverty.
The remainder  of the paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  II provides
a  brief  review  of the  recent  evidence  on  poverty  in  developing  countries.
The various channels  through which macroeconomic  policies  affect the poor
are discussed in Section III. Both direct and indirect effects  (through,  for in-
stance, inflation, aggregate demand, income distribution, and macroeconomic
volatility),  are  analyzed.  The role of the labor  market  is also  discussed  in
general terms.  Section IV develops an analytical  framework that captures in
a more  formal  way the  role of the urban labor  market  in the transmission
mechanism of macroeconomic  policy shocks.  The model incorporates  several
important  and well-documented  features  of the labor  market  in developing
countries:  efficiency  wages,  a large informal  sector,  labor market  segmenta-
tion, a heterogeneous and imperfectly  mobile labor force, and wage flexibility
in the informal economy.'  The impact and steady-state effects of an increase
'Efficiency  wage considerations  have  been much  discussed  in the  recent  literature  on
labor  markets  in  developing  countries  (see  Agenor  (1996)).  Rationales  include  better
3in taxes-a  typical  measure  in  adjustment  programs-are  also  examined.
Section  V  provides  some  cross-section  econometric  evidence  on the  impact
of macroeconomnic  factors  and structural variables  on poverty,  including the
degree of openness, school enrollment rates, real exchange rate depreciations,
macroeconomic  volatility,  income  inequality,  and asymmetric movements  in
income  levels and output  growth.  Finally,  Section VI summarizes the main
results of the analysis and elaborates  on its policy implications.
2  Poverty:  A Brief Overview
It is now well recognized that poverty is  a multidimensional  concept,  encom-
passing not only insufficient income but also lack of access to adequate health
services  and sanitation,  a high degree  of illiteracy,  and deprivation  of basic
rights  and security  (see  World  Bank  (2000)).  These  dimensions  of  human
deprivation interact in many important ways;  for instance,  improvements  in
health conditions lead to higher productivity and enhance the ability of work-
ers  to increase  their  incomes.  Nevertheless,  the  focus  of this brief overview
will be limited to income poverty.
Figure  1 shows  the  evolution  of poverty  in  various  regions  of the  de-
veloping  world  during the  period  1987-98.  The  indicator  displayed  is  the
headcount  index  (the proportion  of individuals  or households  earning  less
than  a given  absolute level  of income,  or poverty  line),  which  measures  the
incidence of poverty.2 Extreme  poverty  (defined  as  living  on less  than  $1
per day)  is shown on the left-hand  side,  whereas relative poverty  (defined as
the share  of people  living  on  less than  $2 per  day)  is shown  on the right-
hand side.  Both indicators  depict a similar picture:  the incidence  of poverty
is the  highest in  South Asia and sub-Saharan  Africa,  and,  apart from East
Asia, little progress has been achieved during the period in reducing poverty
rates.  In sub-Saharan  Africa, poverty has in fact increased  slightly.  Indeed,
following a significant  improvement in living standards during the 1970s and
1980s,  extreme  poverty declined  only slowly in the developing  world during
the 1990s.  The share of the world population living on less than $1  a day fell
nutrition,  incentive  and  morale  factors,  adverse  selection,  turnover  costs,  and  shirking
costs.  As discussed below, such considerations  are particularly important for large, capital-
intensive  firms, which typically  operate in the formal economy.
2See Ravallion (1994)  for a discussion  of this measure of poverty,  as well as the poverty
gap discussed later, and their limitations.
4from 28 percent in 1987 to 23 percent in 1998, and the number of poor people
remained  roughly constant as the population increased.  The share  of people
living on less than $2 per day (a more relevant threshold  for middle-income
economies  such  as  those  of East  Asia  and Latin  America)  showed  roughly
similar  trends.  At the same  time,  progress  in alleviating  poverty has been
far from even across regions.  Between  1987 and 1998,  poverty rose rapidly in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia,  and continued to rise (albeit at a relatively
low rate)  in sub-Saharan  Africa.  In East  Asia,  the proportion  of people  in
poverty  (both extreme and relative)  declined  dramatically  during  the same
period,  despite the fact that the  1997-98  crisis slowed progress  considerably.
But  in  South Asia,  where  a significant  proportion  of the world's  poor  live,
progress  has been much less significant.  And in Latin America, although the
share of the population in poverty fell during the 1990s, the absolute number
of poor people increased to 181  million  (of which 90  million live in extreme
poverty)  in 1998,  as a result of population  growth (Wodon et al.  (2001)).
2.1  Rural and Urban Poverty
The recent  evidence  also suggests that the distribution  of the poor  between
rural and urban areas varies considerably  across regions.  This is particularly
well illustrated when  comparing  Latin America and sub-Saharan  Africa.  In
a country like Chile,  for instance, poverty is evenly distributed between rural
and urban areas  (Anrfquez,  Cowan,  and De Gregorio  (1998)).  By contrast,
in sub-Saharan Africa,  the poor tend to be concentrated  in rural areas.  Ac-
cording to the data compiled by Sahn,  Dorosh,  and Younger  (1997,  Chapter
2), for instance, the share of the national poverty rate accounted for by rural
areas  in the late 1980s  and early  1990s  was  78  percent  in COte d'Ivoire,  66
percent  in Gambia,  72 percent in Ghana,  90 percent in Kenya and Tanzania,
88  percent  in Madagascar,  98  percent  in  Malawi,  and  71  percent  in  Zam-
bia.3 According to World Bank estimates,  three-fourths  of the poor  in C6te
d'Ivoire  in  1995  were located  in rural areas  (World Bank  (1997,  p.  11)).  At
31t  should  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  measures  of rural  and  urban  poverty  rates-
such as  those discussed  by Sahn  et  al.  (1997,  Chapter 2)-are  often made  on the basis
of expenditure  data  that are  not  properly  deflated  across  regions,  owing  to the  lack  of
appropriate  regional  deflators.  Accounting  for  the  difference  between  the cost  of living
between  urban  and  rural  areas  is  nevertheless  crucial  for  poverty  assessment,  in  part
because prices are typically higher in urban areas.  Mazumdar  (1993) for instance estimated
that in Kenya in the late  1980s,  the nominal income  differential  between  rural and urban
areas  was  as  high  as  4:1,  and  the  cost  of living  in  urban  areas  was  60  percent  higher.
5the same time, in many countries  in sub-Saharan  Africa-where  both popu-
lation and urbanization growth rates tend to be relatively  high, compared to
other  regions  of the developing  world-the  regional distribution  of poverty
in the past few years has been substantially affected  by rapid rural-to-urban
migration.  In  several  cases,  urban  poverty,  although  not  as  severe  as  it is
in rural  areas,  has become  a major source  of public  concern.  In Ghana for
instance,  the rural  poverty rate was  34 percent  in 1992,  whereas  the urban
poverty rate was  26.5 percent  (Canagarapajah  and  Mazumdar  (1997)).  Al-
though rural poverty declined sharply between  1987 and 1992, little progress
was  achieved in reducing urban poverty during that period.
The  sources  of income  of the  rural  poor  and the  urban  poor  also  dif-
fer  significantly.  The rural  poor in  many  countries  in sub-Saharan  Africa,
for  instance,  are  predominantly  self-employed  and continue  to rely  on di-
rect earnings  from agricultural production as their main source  of income-
although  income  from  salaried  employment  and  self-employment  in  small
enterprises  have become  important  in some  countries.4 The  data compiled
by Sahn et  al.  (1997)  indicate  that in countries  like  CMte  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,
Guinea,  Madagascar,  and Tanzania,  more than 90 percent  of the rural work-
ers were self-employed in the early 1990s, reflecting the predominance of own-
account agriculture  and, to a much lesser extent, small and micro enterprises
in  manufacturing  and  services.  By contrast,  the  urban  poor are  typically
self-employed  workers  in  very  small  enterprises  in  the  informal  (nonwage)
sector;  but their incomes tend to fluctuate closely with changes in activity in
the formal economy,  because of the ease  of entry in the informal sector and
the degree of mobility of the labor force between  the two sectors.
The distribution of poor households  between rural  and urban  areas  has
important  implications for studies aimed at assessing the effect of short-term
stabilization policies on poverty.  Income characteristics  suggest, for instance,
that the rural poor are less vulnerable, and the urban poor more vulnerable,
Without  price indices (and  thus relative weights)  that account  for consumption  patterns
in both  areas,  the  difference  between  the  incidence  of poverty  in rural  and  urban areas
may be overstated.
4In Ghana, for instance,  the sharp reduction in the rural poverty rate between 1987 and
1992  (from 42 percent to 34 percent)  was the result of a significant increase in the income
generated  by the poor from non-farm  self-employment.  According  to Canagarapajah  and
Mazumdar,  (1997,  p.  44),  the share of such income  in total household  income  increased
from  19.5 percent  in  1987-88  to 25.7 percent  in  1991-92.  At  the same time,  the  share of
income generated from farm self-employment  fell during the same period from 60.4 percent
to 53  percent
6to macroeconomic  policy shocks.  The reason is that, unlike the urban poor,
the  rural poor  can  cushion  the  impact  of  an  adverse  shock  to income  on
consumption  by  adjusting  the share  of their agricultural  output  that they
keep for themselves.5 At the same time, the urban poor tend to benefit more
than  the rural  poor  from  food  subsidies.  Thus,  large  cuts  in  government
subsidies  may have a larger  effect  on the urban poor.  This reasoning  would
suggest that studies focusing on the effects  of macroeconomic adjustment  on
the poor may  need  to analyze  separately  the  behavior  of urban  and rural
poverty  rates,  with  macroeconomic  variables  possibly  playing  a  much  less
significant  role in the former  case.
2.2  How Did Growth Affect  Poverty?
Figures  2 and  3  show the relationship  between growth  (as  measured  by the
annual rate of change of real GNP per capita)  and two measures of poverty:
the headcount  index  (defined  in the previous  section)  and  the poverty  gap
index  (that  is,  the  average  shortfall of the  income of the  poor with respect
to the poverty line, multiplied  by the headcount  index),  which measures the
depth  of  poverty.  Both  extreme  and  relative  poverty  measures  are  used.
The  figures  show  no obvious  pattern  in  the relation  between  growth  and
poverty.  One  reason that may  explain this phenomenon  is that growth  was
accompanied  by significant  changes  in  income  distribution:  while  poverty
could  fall fairly  rapidly with distributionally-neutral  growth  (indeed,  one to
one,  as  Dollar  and  Kraay  (2001)  claim  to have  found),  it  takes only  small
deviations  from neutrality to wipe out those gains.
Latin America is a case in point.  A recent study by Szekely  (2001)  found
that in 12  out of the  17 countries with available  data in the region,  moder-
ate  poverty did decline  during the  1990s  (with  Chile,  Dominican  Republic,
Panama, Uruguay and Brazil recording the largest reductions).  But poverty
increased  in Peru,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Venezuela,  and El Salvador.  In Latin
America as a whole, the share of poor people declined  by 10 percent between
1990  and  1999.  However,  no  country  in  Latin  America  for  which  data on
income distribution are available shows a decline in income inequality during
the 1990s.  Had inequality remained unchanged,  poverty would have declined
5Ofcourse,  a reduction  in the share of marketed agricultural  output would  also lower
cash income and  possibly force a reduction  in the consumption  of non-agricultural  goods
by the rural poor.
7by more  than it  actually  did.  Growth would  have  lifted  90 million of indi-
viduals out of poverty,  instead of 45 million.  Thus, income inequality  swept
away  many  of the  benefits  of  recent  economic  growth  for  large  sectors  of
society in the region.
In Mexico, for instance, between  1996 and 1998,  GDP per capita increased
by 9.7 percent  in real terms.  However,  poverty  barely declined  during that
period.  In  fact,  the  incomes  of the poorest  30  percent  of the population
actually  fell.  The increase in mean income was due entirely to income gains
among  the  richest  30  percent  (particularly  the  richest  10  percent)  of the
population.  Another  example  is  Chile.  Between  1992  and  1996,  GDP per
capita increased  by more than  30  percent  in real  terms.  During the same
period,  moderate  poverty  (as defined  above)  declined  from 20 percent to 16
percent-a 20 percent reduction in the proportion of poor.  However,  income
inequality  also  increased  during the  period.6 Had  the  income  distribution
remained  the same  as  in  1992,  the proportion  of poor  would  have  actually
declined  to 10 percent,  rather than 16 percent.  The poverty rate would have
been cut in half, instead of by 20 percent.  The link between poverty,  growth,
and  inequality  will  be examined  in the next  sections,  from both analytical
and empirical  standpoints.
3  Transmission  Channels
Much  progress  has been achieved  in recent  years  in understanding  the var-
ious  channels  through  which macroeconomic  policy  shocks are transmitted
to output,  employment,  wages,  and  prices  in  a developing-country  context
(for an overview,  see Ag6nor and Montiel  (1999)).  Several of these channels
are  relevant  for understanding  the impact  of macro shocks  on the poor,  in
both rural  and urban  areas.  This  section  identifies  these various  channels,
dwelling on a distinction  between direct  and indirect effects.
3.1  Direct Effects
The  most  direct  channels  through  which  macroeconomic  adjustment  pro-
grams affect  the  poor are public sector  layoffs and freezes  on the wage  bill,
6By contrast, for the period between 1987 and 1992, Anriquez,  Cowan, and De Gregorio
(1998)  suggested  that  in  Chile  up  to  80 percent  of the reduction  of poverty  was  due to
growth, with the rest due to changes  in income distribution.
8cuts in government  expenditure  on transfers  and subsidies,  and increases  in
public sector prices.7
3.1.1  Wage freeze,  Layoffs,  and Spending Cuts
Programs of fiscal consolidation  often take the form  of cuts in real wages in
the public sector  (by freezing the nominal wage bill in a context of non-zero
inflation)  and laying  off unskilled  and/or redundant  employees.  Wage  cuts
and  layoffs  may  raise directly  the poverty rate,  particularly  in the  absence
of a safety  net  (such as  a government-run  unemployment  benefits  scheme)
or  if they  occur  during  periods  of low  activity  (and thus  low  demand  for
labor).  A cut  in  current  transfers  to  low-income  households  reduces  their
resources directly, whereas  a reduction in subsidies on goods or services  that
are consumed by the poor lowers their purchasing power.8 Both may worsen
poverty by forcing  households to reduce consumption,  with the latter effect
depending of course on the consumption-expenditure  pattern of the poor.  As
note earlier,  to the extent that  the urban poor  benefit more  from transfers
and  subsidies  to  begin  with,  urban poverty  rates  may  be more  adversely
affected.
However,  there are various factors suggesting that assessing  the effect  of
macroeconomic policy  on the poor by looking only at aggregate measures  of
public expenditure may be misleading.  First, there is empirical evidence that
social expenditure (including spending on education and health)  benefits dis-
proportionately to upper-income  households.  Camargo  and Ferreira  (2000)
found that in Brazil, for instance,  social expenditures  are disproportionately
appropriated  by  the  middle  classes  and the  rich.  Li,  Steele,  and  Glewwe
(1999),  in a study based on a relatively large group of developing countries,
found that  the share  of the richest  income  quintile  in  public  spending  on
education, at 28%, was more than double that of the poorest income quintile
(13%).  Similar  results were obtained  by Castro-Leal,  Dayton,  Demery  and
Mehra (1999) for a group of African countries.  And in many Latin American
countries,  social security has long been  "reserved"  for relatively  few workers
in the formal sector and for government employees.  In such conditions,  large
7Government  spending on transfers and subsidies also have an indirect  effect on aggre-
gate  demand,  and  changes in public  sector  prices may  have an  indirect impact  on other
prices in the economy,  as discussed  later.
'Large  reductions in subsidies have often been seen as a reflection  of the lack of political
influence of the poor and pressures exerted  by more powerful  interest groups.
9cuts in social expenditure  may have little impact on the poor.
Second, it may be argued that a wage freeze or layoffs of low-productivity
workers,  to the extent that they lower overall  government  expenditure  and
reduce pressures for monetization of the fiscal deficit, may lower inflation and
therefore generate an indirect benefit  for the poor  (see below).  The net wel-
fare  effect,  therefore,  is ambiguous  because  of conflicting  effects on income.
Third,  in  addition  to the  level  effect  associated  with  reductions  in public
expenditure,  there may be a compositional effect:  the share of social spend-
ing in total government expenditure  may actually increase at the same time
that overall  spending  is being cut.9 Moreover,  transfers  and subsidies  may
fall both  as  a percentage  of GDP and as  a percentage  of total  government
expenditure  without any adverse  effect  on poverty  if,  at the same time,  im-
proved targeting of social spending  takes place-thereby improving the flow
of resources  actually  reaching  the  poor.  Indeed,  in some  adjustment  pro-
grams,  expenditure  reforms have entailed a redirection  of health  and educa-
tion expenditures toward basic/preventive health care and primary education
(which benefits the poor more than tertiary education),  and an improvement
in the targeting  of social safety  nets-notably  by transforming  generalized
transfers to households into more  targeted transfers  to the very poor.
Clearly,  expenditure reallocation continues to be a major issue in the de-
sign of adjustment programs-particularly,  at the present  time, in countries
where debt relief,  and associated fiscal  savings,  create new opportunities  for
reform  and  improved  targeting.  But  the lack  of  political  influence  of the
poor,  and pressures exerted  by more powerful interest groups,  may continue
to  represent  major  stumbling  blocks  to pro-poor  reallocations.  The  point,
nevertheless,  is that in cases where fiscal  consolidation  occurs in such a way
that it benefits the poor, the net effect of adjustment may be beneficial-even
if the relative level of public expenditure  falls.
3.1.2  Increases  in Public Sector  Prices
Increases in prices  of goods and services produced by the public sector-such
as utilities and other types of public services, such as toll roads-often figure
prominently in macroeconomic and structural adjustment programs, particu-
larly when large fiscal imbalances prevail at the inception of the program and
9Conversely,  of course, social spending may fall more than proporationally  during peri-
ods of fiscal consolidation.  Ravallion (2000)  documents  the experience  of Argentina during
the  1980s and  1990s, where pro-poor social spending  fell significantly.
10public enterprises  provide  large  transfers  to the government.  Because  they
reduce  the purchasing  power  of the poor,  they hurt them directly.  By how
much  poverty  rises will  depend ultimately  on the consumption-expenditure
pattern of the poor and their ability to  "smooth"  consumption  through dis-
savings and borrowing.  Once again,  however,  if the increase in public sector
prices leads  to a lower  fiscal deficit  and reduced  inflationary  pressures,  the
net effect on the poor may be positive in the medium term.
3.2  Indirect  Effects
Indirect effects of macroeconomic policy on the poor operate through changes
in aggregate  demand  and output  (assuming that  excess  capacity exists  ini-
tially) and employment;  changes  in the rate of economic  growth;  changes  in
inflation  and  the relevant  expenditure  price  deflator  for  the poor;  changes
in the real  exchange  rate;  macroeconomic  volatility;  and  distributional  ef-
fects.'"  In  addition,  output  and  employment  effects  associated  with  stabi-
lization policies may be asymmetric-imparting  some degree of "hysterisis"
to the behavior of poverty rates.
3.2.1  Aggregate  Demand and Employment
The  effects  of stabilization  programs  on  poverty  operating  through  aggre-
gate  demand  and  employment  may  occur  through  various  channels.  The
first category  of effects  results  essentially  from reductions  in  transfers  and
subsidies (as noted earlier) and in government  expenditure other than wages
and salaries.  The  most  important  part  of the latter  component  relates  to
capital spending-cuts  in  which  have  often  been large  in  practice,  due to
the difficulty  of compressing  the  wage  bill.  By reducing aggregate  demand
and employment, poverty may increase-again,  particularly so if an adequate
social safety net is not in place.
The second  category  of effects  through which  macroeconomic  policy af-
fects  aggregate demand operates through changes in private spending.  First,
"0Indirect  effects  through  portfolio  shifts  (and capital  gains  and  losses)  are  typically
limited because the poor hold their assets mostly in the form of noninterest-bearing money
or  bank  deposits.  There  may,  of course,  be  a large  effect  on  relative poverty  (that  is,
income  distribution)  through this channel,  to the extent  that upper-income  groups  hold
more diversified portfolios  of assets.there are  several channels  through which  lower public spending can lead to
a reduction in private expenditure:
*  If public investment  and private sector investment are complementary
(particularly  with regard to public investment  in infrastructure,  as the
evidence for developing  countries suggests),  a cut in public investment
outlays-in addition to its direct  effect  on aggregate  demand indicated
earlier-may reduce the productivity of the private capital stock at the
margin, and thus reduce private expenditure  and aggregate  demand.
*  An increase in direct taxes aimed at reducing fiscal imbalances,  such as
an increase in tax rates on wages or profits, may reduce private expen-
diture on consumption  and investment,  by reducing  expected  income
and the net rate of return on capital.
*  Restrictive credit and monetary policies may lower private expenditure
on consumption  and  investment,  either  directly  (if credit  availability
effects  are important)  or by raising interest rates  (which translate into
a higher cost of capital)."1
However, there are also several channels through which public expenditure
cuts can lead to higher private  expenditure:
*  As implied by Ricardian  equivalence,  a reduction in public expenditure
(such  as  a cut  in capital  spending,  as  noted  earlier)  may  lead  to an
equal reduction in perceived tax liabilities by the private sector-either
because  of an  immediate  reduction  in  taxes currently  paid, or  in the
future owing to lower financing  needs to retire public debt-current  or
future private disposable  income will  increase,  resulting in an increase
in private  spending.  The  net  effect  on aggregate  demand would  thus
be ambiguous.12
*  The  fall  in  domestic  activity  associated  with  a  reduction  in  public
spending  at  the original  level  of prices  and  interest  rates could  also
"lThese effects may be exacerbated  in the presence of wage  and price stickiness  (result-
ing,  for  instance,  from  the prevalence of nominal contracts),  which  imply larger quantity
adjustments  in the short run.
"2The evidence  favoring  the Ricardian  Equivalence  proposition  in developing countries
is, however,  rather weak;  see Agenor  (2000,  Chapter  1)).
12lead to  an  increase  in private  expenditure.  For instance,  if domestic
interest rates adjust downward  immediately to maintain portfolio equi-
librium with  a reduction  in the  demand  for money,  interest-sensitive
components  of aggregate  demand  would  tend  to increase-or,  alter-
natively,  if portfolio  imbalances  tend to  persist,  the  excess supply  of
money  may cause  households to increase  current  spending in order to
lower  their real  holdings of money  balances  (real  balance  effect).  The
net,  general  equilibrium effect  on aggregate  demand  would,  again,  be
ambiguous.
*  Even in the absence  of a real balance effect, the reduction  in financing
requirements  by the  public  sector  may  reduce  the  cost,  or  increase
the  availability,  of  financial  resources  for  the private  sector,  thereby
increasing  private spending  and the ability to produce  (if production
was, to begin with, constrained by the ability to finance working capital
needs).
*  If prices  are  flexible,  or if the cut  in public spending  was foreseen  at
the time that currently prevailing nominal wage contracts  were agreed
upon, the domestic  price level could fall sufficiently to increase private
spending,  thereby mitigating the impact of the cut in public  spending
on total aggregate demand.
The  foregoing  discussion  suggests,  therefore,  that  the  effects  of stabi-
lization  policies on poverty operating though changes  in aggregate  demand
are  less clear-cut  than  is often  thought.  Although  there  are various  chan-
nels through  which such policies may reduce aggregate  demand and worsen
poverty (by reducing output and employment),  there are also channels through
which they  may lead to an  increase  in aggregate  demand  and lower  unem-
ployment.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  that  reductions  in  aggregate  demand
associated with macroeconomic  policy also lead to a fall in inflationary pres-
sures (as discussed below)  they may also benefit the poor.
3.2.2  Economic  Growth
Macroeconomic  policies may  affect  the poor not only  through their impact
on the level  of output but also its growth rate over time.  There are several
channels  through  which  this  can  occur.  Sustained  reductions  in transfer
payments from the public sector to the poor may have  an adverse effect  not
13only on the level of income of the poor but also on their propensity to save.  In
turn, lower savings rates may affect negatively  the growth rate of output,  as
emphasized in endogenous growth models (see Agenor  (2000, Chapter  11)).13
Similarly,  to the extent that cuts in public sector investment (particularly in
infrastructure)  may reduce private investment,  as indicated earlier, they may
lower the rate of economic growth.  Tax increases encourage  evasion  and the
shifting  of activities  to the  informal  economy;  as can  be  inferred  from  the
analysis in Barro  (1990)  and Loayza  (1996),  the loss in tax revenue may, in
the longer  run,  reduce the government's  capacity to invest in infrastructure
and thus lower the rate of economic growth if,  again, there is complementary
between public  and private  capital formation.  In all these cases,  by reducing
the economy's growth rate,  macroeconomic  adjustment may have an adverse
impact  on poverty.
At the same time,  however,  the lower  inflation rates that tend to be as-
sociated with macroeconomic  adjustment  may increase growth rates through
their effect on the level and efficiency of investment, as documented in a num-
ber  of analytical  and empirical  studies  (see,  for  instance,  Choi,  Smith,  and
Boyd  (1996)).  Moreover,  to the extent that adjustment  reduces  the degree
of macroeconomic  volatility  (as discussed later),  it may  also have a positive
effect on growth.
3.2.3  Inflation and Expenditure Deflators
The poor  are  more vulnerable  to inflation  than higher-income  groups  as  a
result of a variety of factors:
*  Their income  (wages  or income from self-employment)  is often defined
in nominal terms, and they often do not benefit from indexation mech-
anisms.  In periods of high inflation, therefore,  the purchasing power of
their resources may fall dramatically.' 4
*  They  have  few  inflation  hedges-few  real  assets,  such  as  land,  and
usually no indexed financial assets-with which to insulate themselves
from the effect of price increases.
13However,  this effect  is probably relatively small in practice,  due to the fact the savings
rates of the poor are  low to begin  with.
14For Latin America,  see in particular  Cardoso (1992)  and Morely  (1995).
14*  Their holdings of cash balances  are subject to the inflation tax, which,
although  not  usually  accounted  for  in standard  measures  of poverty,
could have  a significant  negative  effect  on the welfare  of the poor.'5
All  three  factors  suggest  that  inflation  stabilization  would  benefit  the
poor proportionately  more than upper-income groups.  However,  a number of
mitigating factors should be taken into account.  First, in countries where the
poor are self-employed  (either in the informal urban sector or in agriculture,
as  in many sub-Saharan  African  countries)  and fairly  "biased"  expenditure
patterns,  what  matters  is  not  so  much  the  increase  in the  overall  level  of
prices but rather the extent to which prices of the goods and services that the
poor  consume  (that is,  a  properly-weighted  expenditure  deflator)  increase.
If,  for instance,  basic  staple  foods  account  for  a large  share  of expenditure
of low-income  households,  and  if the  prices  of these  commodities  are  kept
under  control,  disinflation  may  have  little impact  on the  poor.  Second,  to
the extent that macroeconomic  adjustment entails a sharp drop in aggregate
demand  and employment  (as  discussed  earlier),  the excess  supply of labor
may, everything else equal, lead to further downward  pressure on wages  and
a worsening  of the plight of the poor.  Finally,  even if higher  inflation has an
adverse  effect on poverty in the longer run, the foregoing discussion  suggests
that reducing inflation from a high to a low level may not be beneficial in the
short  run,  to the extent  that  it is brought  about through  extensive  cuts  in
social programs.  Thus, as  I stressed in the introduction,  there is a dynamic
trade-off,  which  suggests  that  it is the  net present  value  of a reduction  in
inflation that needs to be assessed, in order to determine if stabilization from
high inflation is indeed beneficial  to the poor.
The situation  is,  in fact,  more  complicated  than that,  because  lower in-
flation also contributes indirectly to growth,  as shown empirically in studies
such as those of Bruno and Easterly  (1998)  and Sarel  (1996).  Higher growth
rates increase  the level of income per capita,  and the higher  level  of income
tends to  lower  measured  poverty  rates,  in the absence  of adverse  shifts  in
inequality  (see  below).  As  noted  earlier,  inflation  may  affect  growth  rates
through  its impact  on the level  and  efficiency  of  investment.  More  specif-
ically,  suppose  that inflation  drives  a wedge  between  the  marginal  returns
to  real  and  financial  capital.  It thus  distorts  production  incentives.  The
"5However,  it  is  possible  (at least  in  principle)  that the  inflation  tax  revenue  serves
to  finance  a  higher  level  of public  expenditure  that  benefits  the poor  directly-thereby
mitigating the adverse,  partial equilibrium  effect of the tax on welfare.
15elimination of this distortion increases both the level and the rate of growth
of output.  In the model  developed  by  Gylfason  (1996)-in which both real
and financial capital are used as inputs in the production process-increased
price stability improves the efficiency with which capital is utilized, and thus
increases the full-employment  level of output in the long run; this represents
a fairly conventional static output gain.  But lower inflation  also increases the
rate of economic growth  in the presence  of constant returns to (broad)  capi-
tal, as emphasized in the new endogenous growth literature (see, for instance,
Easterly  (1993)).  This dynamic  gain can be substantial  in practice,  as sug-
gested by the simulations performed  by Gylfason  (1996).  Thus,  by lowering
the level  of inflation  (and  possibly the  variability  of inflation,  as  discussed
below) and improving the allocation of resources, macroeconomic  adjustment
programs promote growth, thereby enhancing their long-term benefits to the
poor.
3.2.4  Real Exchange Rate
The combination  of exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies implemented
in macroeconomic  adjustment  programs  often aims at achieving  a deprecia-
tion of the real  exchange  rate,  in order to  foster a reallocation  of resources
toward the tradables  sector.  In turn, a real depreciation  may affect  poverty
(and income distribution)  through two main channels:
*  A real depreciation-brought  about  either through a nominal depreci-
ation or a fall  in the price  of nontradable  goods-favors  consumers  of
nontradables  (such as housing and retail services)  in general,  and the
urban poor in particular.  However,  in practice,  a  real depreciation  is
often  implemented  through  a nominal  depreciation,  which  also  raises
the domestic  price  of imported  goods.  To the extent  that such  goods
are consumed by the poor, there is a negative income effect  which may
offset,  at least in part, the relative price effect.
*  A real  depreciation  tends to foster  a reallocation  of resources  toward
agricultural export activities,  raising the income of export-crop farmers
and  rural  households  (see  Dorosh  and  Sahn  (2000)).16  In  countries
1 6Results  of  household  surveys  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  suggest  that  not  only  do  the
poor  sell  agricultural  output,  but that tradable  products,  both exports  and food  crops,
constitute  a significant share of their agricultural  earnings (Sahn et al.  (1997,  p.  32)).
16where the poor are predominantly in the rural areas, a real depreciation
will therefore  raise incomes  and reduce poverty.
However,  there are other offsetting supply-side  effects of a real exchange
rate depreciation that must also be taken into account.  Because resources are
reallocated  toward the tradable sector,  the demand for labor in the nontrad-
able sector may fall;  lower employment and nominal wages  (in the presence
of downward  rigidity of prices)  may translate into a fall in real wages and  a
higher incidence of poverty.  In particular, if the urban poor are also producers
of nontraded goods  (as is the case in the informal  sector), the economy-wide
benefit of a reduction in rural poverty may be highly mitigated and aggregate
poverty may well  increase.
The  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  that often accompanies  macroeco-
nomic adjustment  programs  (at least in their initial stages)  may  also bring
about indirect effects on poverty.  For instance, it has been noted that a real
depreciation  can lead to an increase in the user cost of capital in the tradable
sector, because capital goods (machinery and equipment) are often imported
in developing  countries  (Lora  and  Olivera  (1998)).  This tends  to lower  in-
vestment in fixed capital and,  as a result of complementarity,  to reduce the
demand for skilled workers.  To the extent that skilled and unskilled labor are
net substitutes  (as the  evidence  suggests  for many  countries),  the demand
for unskilled  workers may increase,  raising employment  and average  income
of the poor,  thereby reducing the incidence  of poverty.  However,  to the ex-
tent that the real depreciation  is accompanied  (or brought about)  by a trade
liberalization  program that features a sharp reduction in tariffs,  one may get
the exact  opposite results:  the  user cost  of imported  capital goods  may fall
significantly-thereby  leading to an increase in the demand for skilled labor,
a fall in unskilled employment,  and an increase in poverty.
3.2.5  Macroeconomic  Volatility
A high degree of macroeconomic volatility is a well-documented feature of de-
veloping countries (see Agenor and Montiel  (1999, Chapter  1)).  Such volatil-
ity results very often from external factors  (such as sharp changes in a coun-
try's  terms  of trade or  fluctuations  in world  interest  rates,  due  to  abrupt
changes  in market sentiment)  but is also  sometimes policy-induced,  in part
as  a result  of the  absence  of rules-based  policymaking  and the propensity
to adopt  "stop-and-go"  policies.  Specifically,  macroeconomic  volatility  can
affect the poor through the following  channels:
17*  Investment and growth.  Volatility tends to distort price signals and the
expected  rate of return  for investors;  in the presence  of irreversibility
effects  (see  Dixit and  Pindyck  (1994)),  the  decision to wait  may  lead
to  lower  private  investment  and  lower  growth  rates.  Nonlinearities
generated by capital  market imperfections may also lead to significant
effects of volatility on investment  (Aizenman and Marion (1999)).
*  Precautionary  savings.  The propensity to save  for both rich and poor
households  may  increase  if  macroeconomic  volatility  translates  into
higher income uncertainty or an increased probability of facing borrow-
ing constraints  in  "bad times"  (as  in Agenor  and Aizenman  (2000)).
However, higher savings may also increase resources available for finan-
cial  intermediaries  to lend  to  potential  investors,  thereby stimulating
growth; the net effect  on poverty is thus a priori  ambiguous.
*  Credit  market  effects.  A  higher  degree  of macroeconomic  volatility
may heighten the perceived  risk of default  by lenders and increase the
incidence  of  credit  rationing,  or  lead  to a  higher  risk  premium  and
borrowing  rates  for  private  firms  (see Agenor and  Aizenman  (1998)).
This may have an adverse effect  on  labor demand and the poor.
*  Distributional  effect.  This effect  may itself result  from changes  in in-
flation (see  below).
Several  studies  have  recently  focused  on the impact  of macroeconomic
volatility on growth.  Bleaney  (1996),  for  instance,  in a cross-section study
covering  the  period  1980-90,  found that  macroeconomic  instability  (partic-
ularly  when  measured  by the  fiscal  balance  and the  degree  of volatility  of
the  real  exchange  rate)  has  a significant  negative  effect  on the rate  of eco-
nomic  growth  and possibly  also  a  negative  effect  on  investment.'7 Rodrik
(1998)  obtained  similar results  for sub-Saharan  Africa.  Evidence  for  Latin
America  also suggests  that  macroeconomic  volatility has  tended to worsen
income distribution  and increase poverty in the region  (Londoiio and Szekely
(1997)).  8  Overall,  therefore,  the foregoing  discussion  suggests that  macro-
17In contrast to some other studies inflation in Bleaney's regressions loses its significance
when the indicator  of real exchange rate variability  is introduced.
18Londofio  and Szekely  argued  that this outcome may  be explained  in part by arguing
that the poor are less well equipped to cope with economic  shocks and that incomes of the
poor are  substantially  more sensitive  to changes in aggregate  income than  upper-income
groups.
18economic adjustment,  to the extent that it results in greater macroeconomic
stability,  may  well  lead  to higher growth  rates  and reduce the  incidence  of
poverty.
3.2.6  Distributional Effects
As  noted  in the previous  section,  the  impact  of growth on poverty  can be
highly mitigated by changes  in income distribution.  In general,  large  differ-
ences may exist between countries  in the extent to which even a distribution-
neutral growth process  will affect  poverty.  The gains  to the poor  from such
growth will tend to be lower the higher the extent of initial inequality;  under
distribution-neutrality,  a smaller share of total income must imply a smaller
absolute  gain from a given  increase in total income.  The evidence reviewed
by  Bruno, Ravallion,  and Squire  (1998)  suggests  that growth  is not  always
distribution neutral and that changes in distribution can indeed have a large
impact  on  poverty.  They  estimate  that,  holding mean  income  constant,  a
1 percentage  point  increase  in the  Gini index  is  typically  associated  with
roughly  a  4 percentage  point  increase  in the proportion  of the population
living  on  less than  $1  a day.  There  is  also  a growing  analytical  literature
suggesting that initial distribution  matters to the extent  and nature of sub-
sequent  growth  (see,  for  instance,  Galor and  Zeira  (1993)).  This  link  can
operate  through  credit  market  constraints,  which  limit  the  ability  of the
poor to invest in acquiring skills.
Another channel  through  which inequality may affect  growth is through
changes in macroeconomic  volatility.  Ramey and Ramey (1995))  found that
greater  volatility  of  the  growth  rate  tends  to  reduce  the  average  rate  of
growth-an  effect that may in part be due to its deterring effect  on physical
and human capital  accumulation.  More recently, Breen and Garcia-Penalosa
(1999), using a cross-section of 80 developed and developing countries,  found
that income inequality is positively correlated with aggregate volatility, mea-
sured by the standard deviation  of the annual  growth rate of output.
Several  explanations  have  been  put  forward  to account  for  the adverse
impact that inequality may have on macroeconomic  volatility and ultimately
on growth.  Alesina and Perotti  (1996)  argued that high inequality may lead
to  political  instability,  which  may  in  turn  results  in  high  macroeconomic
volatility  and lower growth.  Aghion,  Caroli  and Garcia-Penalosa  (1999,  pp.
1628-30),  by  contrast,  argued  that  there is  a  direct  effect  of inequality  on
macroeconomic fluctuations.  Inequality in (initial) resources leads to inequal-
19ity in access  to investment  opportunities  across  individuals  in the presence
of capital  market  imperfections-as  a result,  for  instance,  of collateral  ef-
fects.  This can  generate  persistent  and large  cyclical  fluctuations  in credit
and investment  (as individuals  increase  borrowing during booms and reduce
it during recessions)  that  are detrimental  to growth because  of unexploited
possibilities  to invest  in high-yield  projects.
An important  question is, then, what accounts for changes in income dis-
tribution?  Figure 4 displays  the correlation  between the Gini coefficient  and
real GDP  per  capita  for the sample  of developed  and  developing  countries
included  in the study  of Dollar  and  Kraay  (2001).  The figure  suggests  a
"clustering"  pattern-higher-income  developed countries,  in general,  tend to
have  lower  inequality  than developing  countries.  At the  same time,  within
the group of developing countries,  the relationship appears to be positive-a
relationship  that  is consistent  with  the view  that higher  inequality  is  con-
ducive to a higher  aggregate  propensity  to save,  higher  rates of capital  ac-
cumulation,  and  higher growth  rates.  However,  recent  formal  econometric
studies  (such  as  Barro  (2000))  have  been  unable  to find  a robust  relation
between per capita income and inequality.  In particular,  the hypothesis  of a
Kuznets curve, an inverted U-shape between income levels and inequality,  ap-
pears to be fragile (see  also Fishiow (1995)).  There is stronger evidence that
changes  in income  inequality  are related  to investment  in  human capital-
and  thus to borrowing constraints,  as noted earlier.  As argued by Londonio
and  Szekely(1997,  2000), particular,  the worsening in income inequality ob-
served  in Latin America  in recent  years  appears  to have  been the result  of
growing  inequalities  in educational  opportunities  and inadequate  access  to
credit markets.
High and variable  inflation may also explain large changes  in the distrib-
ution of income and  wealth;  such effects  may be of considerable  importance
in evaluating the costs and benefits of macroeconomic  adjustment  programs.
In general,  changes in income distribution are the result of two categories of
factors:  the  allocation  of assets  (both  real  and  financial)  and their  relative
rates of return.  Inflation affects  income distribution  through both channels.
First,  it affects  the relative values  of different  assets  and liabilities.  Unan-
ticipated  inflation,  in particular,  by lowering the  real value of both nominal
assets  and liabilities,  favors  debtors and holders  of real equity  over lenders
and  owners of nominal assets.  In the absence  of indexation,  it  also  affects
negatively suppliers of labor locked in long-term  employment  contracts.  The
net distributional effects will depend on access to hedging instruments  (most
20notably  the  degree  of contractual  indexation),  the  incidence  and length of
contracts, and the distribution of nominal assets and liabilities across income
groups.  In developing  countries  with a relatively unsophisticated  financial
system, lower-income  groups rarely  hold significant  nominal liabilities  (such
as mortgages),  in contrast  to middle-income  groups.  As a result,  the poor
may suffer from inflation through an erosion of their nominal assets (as noted
earlier),  whereas the middle class may benefit from an erosion of its nominal
liabilities.
Second,  inflation  affects  income distribution  by altering  relative  returns
on  assets.  If indexed  assets  and foreign-currency  denominated  assets  are
held principally by upper-income  groups,  whereas lower-income  groups hold
mainly domestic cash, then inflation, even  if expected,  will increase inequal-
ity,  because the inflation tax  (as noted earlier)  will  be borne by the poorer
segments of society.  Third,  high inflation may also affect income distribution
indirectly by lowering output and employment through a variety of channels,
including distortions  in relative  price  signals  and their effects  on allocative
efficiency,  as discussed earlier.
The foregoing  discussion suggests that,  in principle inflation  may either
increase  or reduce  distributional  inequalities.  Indeed,  Figure  5,  which dis-
plays the correlation between inequality  (as measured by the Gini index)  and
inflation  for the group of developed and developing  countries included in the
data compiled by Dollar and Kraay  (2001),  does not show any obvious asso-
ciation between the two variables-beyond  the  clustering pattern  observed
in  Figure 4.  However,  several formal  empirical  studies found that inflation
tends  indeed to increase  inequality.  Bulir  (2001),  in particular,  found that
the adverse  effect  of inflation on income distribution  is highly significant  at
high inflation  levels.  Overall,  thus,  macroeconomic  adjustment,  by lower-
ing mean  inflation and its variability,  may have  a very significant  effect  on
poverty,  by reducing income inequality.
3.3  Asymmetric  Effects  of Cycles and Crises
A growing  body of empirical  evidence  suggests that cyclical  downturns and
economic  crises  may  have  an  asymmetric  effect  on  poverty:  recessions  or
sharp output contractions  may  increase  poverty rates significantly,  whereas
expansions  tend to have  a more limited  effect.  To the extent that the aus-
terity measures that are often at the core of macroeconomic  adjustment  pro-
grams  lead to adverse,  short-run  movements  in output,  asymmetric  effects
21may mitigate significantly the longer-run benefits  of adjustment for the poor.
It  is  thus  important  to  understand  the  sources  of asymmetry.  Following
Ag6nor  (2001),  five  main classes  of explanations  can be distinguished.  The
first dwells  on  parents'  decisions  regarding  their children  attending  school;
the second  is based on asymmetric  changes  in expectations  and  confidence
factors;  the third  on  a  "credit  crunch"  at the firm  level,  with rationing  in-
duced by either  adverse selection problems  or negative  shocks to net worth;
the fourth emphasizes  the impact of borrowing constraints on household  con-
sumption  behavior;  and the fifth dwells on  "labor hoarding"  by firms facing
high turnover costs.
3.3.1  Schooling  Effects
A fall in real  income during an economic downturn may have an irreversible
impact on the human capital of the poor.  Lustig (2000),  for instance,  argued
that children in poor families (particularly the very poor ones) are sometimes
taken out of school  and put  to work  in response  to large adverse  shocks-
thereby mitigating  the fall in the household's income-but  they are not sent
back to school when the "good times"  roll again.  To the extent that negative
shocks to income affect adversely the ability of the poor to enhance their stock
of human capital,  they will also hinder their ability to escape from poverty.
Thus, large recessions  create some sort  of "asymmetric  hysteresis"  effect  on
poverty,  in the sense of temporary  negative shocks  having persistent  effects.
However,  the evidence  supporting this view is mixed;  for instance, Neri  and
Thomas  (2000)  found that in Brazil, children are not more likely to drop out
of school in recessions than during expansions.  At the same time the evidence
gathered by Gaviria (2001)  for seven Latin American countries suggests it is
the lower middle-class households  (rather than the poor households)  that are
more likely to cut back on human capital investments  in response to adverse
income  shocks.
3.3.2  Expectations  and Confidence  Factors
Consumers and firms  may be more  pessimistic  during recessions  than they
are optimistic during expansions,  and immediate prospects may matter more
during downturns than future prospects.  If consumers and firms worry more
about  the overall  economic  outlook and the economy's  likely direction  in a
downturn,  a positive  output  shock-induced  by,  say,  a relaxation  of credit
22constraints-may  have  a smaller  impact (and  thus be less effective)  on pri-
vate spending  decisions  during recessions  than during  booms.  In addition,
if the perceived  degree  of uncertainty  about  future profitability  rises during
recessions,  firms  may  be  less  willing  to invest-even  after  a large  (policy-
induced)  positive shock to aggregate  demand.  The reason,  of course,  is the
"option value"  associated with waiting for the uncertainty to dissipate (Dixit
and Pindyck  (1994)).  If output and labor  demand become less responsive to
positive shocks  during a recession,  the initial increase in poverty induced by
higher unemployment  may be difficult to reverse.
3.3.3  Adverse  Selection,  Net Worth, and Credit
Recessions  may be accompanied  by high or increasing  interest  rates because
an economic slowdown may raise the risk of bankruptcy.  This may lead banks
to raise  the premium that  they charge  over and above the cost of funds,  as
shown  for  instance  by Agenor  and Aizennan  (1998).  An  increase  in  the
perceived  risk of default  may  also lead  to a tightening  of credit  constraints
if lenders  are  unwilling  to  lend to riskier  borrowers,  as  implied  by adverse
selection  models of the credit  market  (see,  for  instance,  Jaffee  and Stiglitz
(1990)).  The  tightening  of  credit  constraints  may  magnify  the  impact  of
the initial recession  on borrowing and spending,  through  both demand-  and
supply-side  effects.  The resulting  fall  in labor  demand  and thus  the  effect
on poverty  may  also  be  compounded.  If expansions  are  not  characterized
by an equivalent  reduction in the perceived risk of default,  adverse  selection
problems may impart an asymmetric bias to output shocks.19
A  related  argument  that  may explain  a  credit  crunch  in  an  economic
downturn is based on net worth effects.  A collapse in asset prices  (e.g.  real
estate or equity prices)  may lead to a sharp drop in the value of the collateral
against  which  firms  borrow.  To  the  extent  that  firms  (particularly  small
and medium-size  ones)  have limited alternatives  to secure loans, banks may
curtail  credit  because  of the  drop  in value  of assets  that they can  seize  in
case  of default,  possibly affecting  smaller  firms  the  most.  A lower  level  of
credit (or a higher risk premium)  will, again,  reduce output and employment,
and eventually increase  the incidence of poverty.  An asymmetric effect  may
'9 As discussed  in  detail  by Agenor  (2001),  two  factors  may  compound  the incidence
of a  credit crunch  induced  by  information  problems:  the degree  of concentration  in the
financial system, and the fact that small and medium-size firms tend to be more dependent
on bank credit  than large firms.
23result  from the fact that,  after the crisis, economic  uncertainty may remain
high,  expectations may remain pessimistic at least for a while, entailing as a
result a slow  recovery in asset  prices.
3.3.4  Borrowing  Constraints and Household  Consumption
Credit  constraints  operating  at  the  household  level  may  also  represent  a
source  of asymmetry  in  the response  of poverty  to output  shocks.  If such
constraints  become  binding during recessions-as  a result  of adverse  selec-
tion,  or net worth  effects,  because  household  wealth may  be also  adversely
affected by sharp drops in asset prices-they may hamper the ability of house-
holds to smooth consumption.20 The available evidence suggests indeed that
risk-sharing  and consumption  smoothing remain  highly  imperfect  in devel-
oping  countries.  The  poorest  households  are  typically  those  least  insured
against shocks because of their inability to accumulate  assets and because,  as
noted earlier,  asymmetric  information problems  and high transaction  costs
may  completely  preclude  access  for  them  to private  market  insurance  or
credit  mechanisms  to smooth  income  fluctuations.  As  a  result,  consump-
tion smoothing through  borrowing  and lending  is simply not feasible.  Poor
households  may  then  have  no  option but  to engage  in  either  sub-optimal
labor allocation  decisions  (such as  forcing children to quit school and work,
as  noted earlier),  or to let consumption  fluctuate  as  much as income-with
possibly detrimental  longer-run effects  on productivity.
3.3.5  The "Labor Hoarding" Hypothesis
The  argument  is that  recessions  may  worsen poverty  because  of an asym-
metric  effect  on employment  and  productivity  (see  Agenor  (1999,  2001a)).
In  a downturn,  unskilled  workers  (among  which  the poor  tend  to be  con-
centrated)  are often the first to lose their jobs  as firms  "hoard"  their skilled
labor  force  because  of the existence  of high turnover  costs  (hiring,  training
and  firing costs)  associated  with the use  of that category of labor.  The in-
centive  to do  so  is higher the  more transitory  the shock  is perceived  to be.
20In principle, the possibility of binding borrowing constraints in adverse state of nature
does  not,  by  itself,  result  in an  asymmetric  effect.  Households  may  "internalize"  state-
dependent  credit constraints  by deciding,  in response to  income risk, to accumulate more
assets or engage in precautionary savings  in  "good"  times in order to shelter consumption
in "bad" times.  Recent evidence on this type of ex ante risk-mitigating strategy is provided
by Agenor  and Aizenman  (2000)  for sub-Saharan  Africa.
24Firms  are therefore off their (skilled)  labor demand  curve during recessions,
and skilled workers'  wages are  higher than their marginal  product.  During
expansions,  the priority  for firms  is  to recoup  the  productivity  losses  and
foregone  profit  opportunities  incurred  during the  downturn.  If the greater
degree of complementarity  between skilled labor and physical capital is high,
they therefore increase fixed investment and reduce their demand of unskilled
labor.  This, in turn, may produce a strong degree of persistence in unskilled
unemployment  and poverty in the early stages of an expansion.
3.4  The Role of the Labor Market
The thrust of the foregoing discussion is that there are a variety of channels-
with possibly offsetting  (direct  and indirect)  effects-through  which macro-
economic adjustment  affects poverty.  The importance of each of these chan-
nels will in general  depend on the institutional and structural characteristics
of individual economies.
A key underlying theme of the discussion,  however,  is that the labor mar-
ket is  a crucial element  in understanding poverty.  The poor often generate
a significant  share  of their income  from  labor services.  The way  the  labor
market  operates  conditions  the  employment  and  wage  outcomes  of adjust-
ment  programs.  There  are,  of  course,  more  general  reasons  than  poverty
itself for focusing on the role of the labor market in the process of macroeco-
nomic  adjustment.  Whether  or not  a real devaluation  leads  to a reduction
in  the current  account  deficit,  for instance,  depends  largely  on the  extent
to  which  real  wages  are  flexible  downward.  And labor  market  distortions
may affect the productivity of all categories  of workers, skilled and unskilled,
thereby  affecting  the incomes  of all types  of households  and  the economy's
overall growth rate.  Nevertheless,  because  of their precarious condition,  the
poor are likely to be particularly affected by labor market imperfections that
prevent  an efficient  allocation  of resources.
As noted earlier,  for studies focusing on the role of short-term  macroeco-
nomic factors on poverty in developing  countries, understanding  the dynam-
ics of the urban labor market  is crucial.  In this respect  there are a number
of important institutional characteristics  of this market that need to be con-
sidered.2 "  In general,  the urban  labor market  can  be divided  into a formal
21See Agenor  (1996)  for a  detailed  overview of the literature,  and  Bigsten and Horton
(1998)  for  a survey  of  labor  markets  in sub-Saharan  Africa.  See  also Horton,  Kanbur,
25segment  (which  includes,  on the demand  side,  large private enterprises  and
the public sector) and an informal segment, which is characterized  by ease of
entry, a high degree of wage flexibility,  and the absence  of enforcement  of la-
bor regulations.22 Because formal employment  in many developing countries
(in both Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa)  has increased only slowly in
recent decades,  whereas urban migration has been extensive,  informal urban
employment  has increased  dramatically  in  size.  In Kenya,  for instance,  the
share  of the informal  sector  in employment  outside  agriculture  is currently
about  60  percent.  In  Ghana,  between  1980  and  1990,  employment  in  the
formal sector declined significantly,  despite a substantial increase  (by 50 per-
cent)  of the non-agricultural  labor force.  Estimates  by Canagarapajah  and
Mazumdar  (1997,  p.  45)  suggest  that  much  of the  expansion  in the  labor
force  was absorbed  by the informal  sector,  whose  size increased  from  36  to
45  percent  of the total  (agricultural  and  non-agricultural)  labor  force.  In
Bangladesh,  90 percent of the labor force is in the informal  (nontraded)  sec-
tor,  mainly  in  rural  areas.  In  Latin  America,  informal  sector  employment
accounted  for  57.4  percent  of total employment  in  1996,  nearly  6  percent-
age points  more than in  1990.  For the region  as a whole,  the expansion  in
the number of informal  sector jobs during the same period accounted  for 80
percent  of the net increase  in employment  (Lora and Olivera,  1998,  p.  10).
Figure 6 suggests that the  size of the urban informal  sector  tends  to be in-
versely related with  the level and rate of growth  of GDP per capita.  There
is also some evidence that the size of the informal sector  is related to the tax
burden;  Figure 7  suggests indeed that both the share of overall  tax revenue
in GDP and the share of direct taxes in GDP are inversely related with the
share of urban informal  sector employment.
Empirical  studies  indicate  that  workers  in  the  formal  sector  typically
have  higher  levels of education  than  informal  sector  workers.  In part  this
is because  formal sector firms use more advanced  technologies,  which require
workers  with higher  levels  of skills  (and sometimes  considerable  on-the-job
and  Mazumdar  (1994)  and  the  World  Bank  (1995).  Marquez  and  Pages-Serra  (1998)
review  regulations  governing  hiring,  firing,  overtime  work,  social  security contributions,
minimum  wages  and  collective bargaining  in Latin  America,  and  examines  their impact
on labor market  outcomes.  Edwards  and Cox Edward  (2000)  discuss the case of Chile.
22The  informal  sector  can  be defined  in various  ways.  A  common  definition  is that it
includes  self-employed  workers  (except  for professionals)  unpaid  family  workers,  workers
employed  in  small firms  (less  than, say,  5 or 6 workers),  and  those working  in the trade
and services sector without  a contract.
26training)  to be operated.  Higher wages  allow firms  to reduce turnover  costs
for highly-skilled  workers.  A study of the manufacturing industry in Kenya,
for  instance,  found  a very  significant  effect  of firm  size  on wages  (Bigsten
and Horton  (2001)),  even after controlling for (observable)  labor quality dif-
ferences  and  working  conditions.  In  addition  to  reducing  labor  turnover,
firms  may be  willing to  pay  more to  enhance  productivity,  attract  better
workers,  or maintain  loyalty  and  morale,  in line  with various  forms of effi-
ciency  wage theories  (see Agenor  (1996,  2000)).  The evidence  also  suggests
that the urban poor (who provide mostly unskilled labor) are disproportion-
ately employed  in the informal  sector.  In Chile,  for instance,  30 percent  of
employment  in the total population  was informal  in 1994;  it was  45  percent
amongst the poor (Anrfquez,  Cowan, and De Gregorio (1998)).  Estimates for
sub-Saharan Africa are much higher.  Thus,  "disguised"  unemployment often
characterizes the urban informal labor market.  Other evidence indicates that
open unemployment  is also important  in many developing  countries,  affect-
ing both skilled and unskilled workers.  This suggests that the extent of labor
mobility between the formal and the informal  sectors,  although quite  high,
may not be perfect  at  least in the short run-thereby  limiting the  "shock-
absorbing",  or countercyclical,  role of the informal  sector.  The next section
presents a macroeconomic  model with a labor market structure that captures
several of the characteristics  highlighted  above,  and analyzes  the impact of
fiscal adjustment  on poverty.
4  Macroeconomic  Policy,  the  Urban  Labor
Market, and Poverty
Dwelling  on the  above  observations,  this section presents  a macroeconomic
model of a small open developing economy that provides a useful framework
for the analysis of the role of the labor market in the transmission of macro-
economic  policies  to the poor.23 Three categories  of agents  are assumed to
operate in the economy considered:  firms, households,  and the government.24
The nominal exchange rate is fixed.  The economy  consists of two major seg-
ments:  the  formal  economy  and the informal  sector.  The  capital  stock  in
23Demery  and  Addison  (1994)  provide a partial equilibrium  analysis  of the  role of the
labor market in the transmission  process of expenditure-switching  policies.
24The model could be extended, along the lines described in Agenor (1998), to introduce
a trade union  in the formal sector.
27each  production  sector  is fixed  within the time  frame of the  analysis.  The
labor force is also fixed and consists of skilled and unskilled workers.
4.1  Basic Structure
4.1.1  The Formal Sector
Production in the formal economy consists of an exportable good and requires
both types of labor.  For simplicity,  total output  of exportables  is  assumed
to be  sold  abroad.25 The  price  of  exportables  is  fixed  on world  markets;
the demand  for exportables  is infinitely  elastic at  that price,  and output is
supply-determined.  Setting the world  price  of exportables  to unity implies
that the domestic  price of exports is equal to the nominal exchange  rate, E.
Let  Yx  denote  the  production  of exportables,  ns and  nu  employment
levels of skilled and unskilled labor (measured in natural units) in that sector,
and e  the level of effort provided  by a typical skilled  worker.26 Assuming  a
Cobb-Douglas production technology  yields27
Yx  =  (ens)n 1-a  0 < a  < 1.  (1)
Generalizing the specification developed by Ag6nor and Aizenman (1999),
the effort  function is defined as
e = 1-A( Q )',  0 < A < 1, yŽ  > 0,  (2)
Ws
where w'  denotes the consumption wage for skilled workers in the exportables
sector,  and Q the worker's reservation  wage.  Equation  (2)  indicates that an
increase  in skilled  workers'  consumption  wage  relative to  their reservation
wage  raises  the  level  of  effort.  Effort  is  also  concave  in  w'.  If effort  is
independent  of relative  wages  (ry  = 0),  or if the  consumption  wage is equal
to the reservation wage,  e = 1 - A. 28
25The model can be extented to account for the existence of a sector producing importa-
bles, but at the cost of greater complexity.
2 "The  level of effort provided  by an unskilled worker is constant and normalized to unity
for simplicity.
27Note that  the assumed technology  implies  that skilled  and unskilled  labor are Edge-
worth complements.
28An  alternative  way to  introduce  efficiency  considerations  in the  formal sector  would
be to assume that production  requires  (as  noted earlier)  skilled labor to operate physical
28Whereas skilled  workers determine  the level of effort  on the basis of the
consumption  wage  that  they face,  producers  set  instead  the product wage,
ws.  Suppose that the consumer  price index is a weighted,  geometric  average
of the price of imported goods, E-assuming that the foreign-currency  price
of these goods is normalized  to unity-and the price of nontradables,  PN:
P = El-,PI,  O < 6  < 1,  (3)
where 6 measures  the share of home goods  in total expenditure.
Let  z = E/PN denote  the relative  price of imports in terms of nontrad-
ables;  z  will  be  referred  to in what  follows  as  the real  exchange  rate.  By
definition,  therefore,  P = z-6E, so that
c  6(4 Ws = z  WS.  (4)
A binding minimum  wage  for unskilled  workers  is in place in the formal
economy.  For a given level  of the minimum wage, firms  in the formal sector
determine employment levels and the product wage earned by skilled workers
so as to maximize profits  and minimize the cost of skilled labor in efficiency
units.  Formally,  let wm  be  the real  minimum  wage  (measured  in terms of
the price  of exportables)  earned  by  unskilled  workers  in the  formal  sector.
Assuming that firms  incur no hiring or firing costs,  the  decision  problem  is
thus
max  IIx  [1 -A(  , 5 )7]ns  n  - wsns  -wmnu,
nS ,nu  ,w5  ZWS 
with  z and wm  taken as given.
The first-order conditions  for this optimization problem  are:
a(-  ¶1  A(  6  ) ens  ZwS)l  = ws,  (5)
(1 -a)(-)  n  =  Wi,  (6)
ens
capital.  Firms would then set wages  to minimize turnover  costs.  Assuming that the quit
rate is a function of the consumption wage would yield results that are qualitatively similar
to those  described below  (see Agenor, 2001b).
29ens  ~aWs  ens  WS  ZW
The  first  two  conditions  equate  the  real  net  marginal  product  of  each
category  of labor  to  the  relevant  real  wage.  The  third  determines  skilled
workers'  wage  so as  to ensure  that  the level of effort  is optimal.  It can  be
re-written  as
a-yA(  nu )  6-c(  )  =ws,
ens  z6w5
which  can be equated with condition  (5)  to give
(1±+  -y)A(  Q  )7 =  1,
z  ws
so that
ws=  [(1  +  O)A]  Q =(z, Q),  0,  <0,  Os,  > 0.  (8)
Equation  (8)  indicates that the efficiency  wage  for skilled workers is neg-
atively  related to the  real  exchange  rate  and positively to the  opportunity
cost of effort.  For a given level of the product wage, a depreciation  of the real
exchange  rate  (resulting  from  a fall  in the price  of nontradables)  increases
the consumption  wage  and thus tends to raise  the  level of effort-allowing
firms to reduce the equilibrium product  wage.
The demand functions for labor can be derived from the above equations
as:
n  nWS  =  d  SWM)  nu  nu  UWs; Wm)-  (9)
These  equations  indicate that an increase  in the product  wage for either
category  of labor reduces the demand  for both of them,  as a result of gross
complementarity.
Substituting these results in equation (1) and using (8)  yields the supply
function  of exportables:
Y  =  Y  (Ws  =  Yx(0;  (10)
304.1.2  The Informal Economy
Firms  in the  informal  economy  produce  a  nontraded  good,  which  requires
only unskilled labor and is used only for final consumption.  The price of this
good is flexible,  and adjusts to equilibrate  supply and demand.
Technology  for  the  production  of the  nontraded  good  in  the  informal
sector is characterized  by decreasing returns to labor:
YN  =  nN  o  < 7<71,  (11)
where  YN  denotes  output  of  home  goods,  and  nN  the  quantity  of  labor
employed  in  the  informal  economy.  Producers  maximize  profits  given  by
z
1 yN  - WNnN,  where  WN  <  Wi  denotes  the real  wage  in the  informal  sec-
tor,  measured  in  terms  of the  price  of exportables.29 Profit  maximization
yields  the  familiar  equality  between  marginal  revenue  and  marginal  cost,
WN  = Yk/Z,  from which labor demand can be derived as
n=  (WNZ)1/(?1),  n  di  < 0,  (12)
N  77N
where WNz  measures  the product  wage  in the informal  sector.  Substituting
equation  (12)  in  (11)  yields  the supply  function for  goods produced  in the
informal sector:
YN  =  (WNZ)?/(7-1)  YN/  <  0.  (13)
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4.1.3  Households
There  are two categories of households in the economy:  an "upper-income"
household,  which  consists  of  all  workers  (skilled  and  unskilled)  employed
in  the  formal  economy,  and  a  "low-income"  household,  which  consists  of
all  workers  employed  in the  informal  sector.30 The key  difference  between
upper-  and low-income  households  is that the  former  group saves a fraction
29The condition  that  the minimum  wage  be  higher  than the  informal  sector  is  neces-
sary  to  prevent  a  corner  solution  in which  unskilled  workers  have  no  incentive  to  seek
employment  in the formal sector.
30An  alternative  approach  (at this  level  of sbstraction)  would  be to  assume  that  all
unskilled workers,  in both the formal and informal sectors,  are poor.  As noted earlier,  the
empirical  evidence suggests  indeed  that the average  number  of years  of schooling  of the
poor tends typically to be lower than  that of the total workforce.
31of its current  disposable  resources  and  accumulates  wealth  in the  form  of
a tradable  interest-bearing  bond,  whereas the latter group  (which  pays  no
income taxes) spends all of its income.  Both categories  of households  supply
labor inelastically  and consume,  in addition to the nontraded good produced
in the informal sector,  an imported  good which  is imperfectly  substitutable
for the home good.
Consider  first the  upper-income  household.  Its income  consists  of total
output of exportables,  Y.,  and interest  income on holdings of traded bonds,
i*B*,  where  i*  is  the  world  interest  rate  (assumed  constant)  and  B*  the
foreign-currency  value  of these  holdings.31 Total  consumption  expenditure,
CR, depends  positively on both disposable income and current  wealth:32
CR=a(Yx+i*B*-T)+vB*,  O<a<1, v>O,  (14)
where T denotes lump-sum taxes (measured in terms of the price of exporta-
bles) paid by the upper-income  household.  The last term in this expression,
vB*,  captures a wealth effect.
If all savings  is invested  in interest-bearing  assets,  the flow of savings or
the stock of foreign bonds held by the upper-income  household evolves  over
time according to
B* = YX  + i*B*  - T - CR,
that is, using (14):
(1 - a&)(YX  + i*B* - T) - vB*.  (15)
The upper-income  household  consumes  imported  goods (in quantity  C)
as well as home goods (in quantity cRN).  Assuming a Cobb-Douglas sub-utility
function, the allocation of total consumption expenditure among these goods
is given by
CR  =  (1-
6 )CR,  CR  =  &ZCR,  (16)
3'More  generally, it could be assumed that the upper-income  household holds, in  addi-
tion to foreign bonds,  domestic assets (such  as land).  To avoid complicating  the analysis
further, domestic  sources of wealth  accumulation  are ignored in what follows.
32Life-cycle  models would  predict a relationship  between  lifetime wealth and consump-
tion,  rather  than income  and  current  wealth.  However,  in the presence  of liquidity  con-
straints current  income  would  also  affects  expenditure.  See the  evidence  for developing
countries  discussed  by  Khayum  and Baffoe-Bonnie  (1994)  and  Veidyanathan  (1993),  or
the literature review in Agenor  (2000,  Chapter 1) and Agenor and Montiel (1999, Chapter
3).
32where  6,  as indicated earlier,  measures the share of home goods in expendi-
ture.
Resources of the low-income household (measured in terms of exportables)
consist  of income  generated in the informal  economy,  z-'Yk.  All income  is
spent on consumption,  cp:
Cp = z-'Y.  (17)
Assuming for simplicity an allocation rule across consumption goods that
is similar to the upper-income  household's  yields
C  =  (1  - 6)Cp,  cN =  6ZCP.  (18)
4.1.4  The  Market for Informal Sector  Goods
The  equilibrium  condition  of the market  for informal  sector  goods  can  be
written as:
CN  N YN  = CR  +  CP.
Using equations  (13),  (16)  and  (18),  this condition becomes
Yk(WNZ)  =  6 Z(CR + CP),
which can be re-written  as, using  (17):
Yk(w)NZ)  1  - ZCR-  (19)
4.1.5  The Informal Labor Market
The demand for labor in the informal sector is derived from profit maximiza-
tion and  is given by equation (12).  Determining the supply of labor involves
two steps.  First, in line with the  "luxury unemployment"  hypothesis,  skilled
workers  who are unable to obtain  a job in the formal sector  are assumed to
prefer  to remain  unemployed  rather than seek employment  in  the informal
economy.33 Second, the supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector, nt,,
33Evidence  supporting this hypothesis  is provided by Hirata  and Humphrey  (1991)  for
Brazil,  Horton  et al.  (1994),  and  Banerjee  and  Bucci  (1995)  for  India.  Agenor  (1996)
provides  a  review  of the  evidence  on  skilled  unemployment  in  developing  countries.  In
general, of course,  whether  skilled workers who are  not successful  in applying for a job in
the formal  sector decide to seek employment  in the informal  economy depends  on factors
such as the efficiency  of on-the-job search activities,  demotivation  effects,  and the degree
of support from relatives.
33is assumed  to change  gradually over time as a function  of wage  differentials
across  sectors.  Wage  and employment  prospects  are formed on the basis of
prevailing conditions in the labor market.  Thus, denoting by nu the constant
number of unskilled workers in the labor force, the supply of labor in the in-
formal sector,  np  - nu,  is also given at any point in time.  The equilibrium
condition of the labor market  in the informal  economy can consequently  be
written as
nu - nu= nN(WNz).  (20)
With  wages in the informal  sector adjusting  continuously  to equilibrate
supply and demand  for labor,  this equation yields:34
WN  =  WN(Z,fnu),  aWN/aZ  =  -1,  (21)
which indicates  that a depreciation  of the real  exchange  rate has a negative
and offsetting  effect on the market-clearing  wage.  The reason  is that,  with
labor supply constant,  labor demand cannot change-which in turn requires
the  product  wage  to remain  constant.  An increase  in the number of work-
ers  seeking employment  in the formal economy  has a positive effect  on the
market-clearing  wage.35
Migration flows are determined  by expected income opportunities,  along
the  lines  of Harris and Todaro  (1970).36  The  expected  wage  in  the formal
economy  is equal  to the minimum  wage  weighted  by the probability  of be-
ing hired in the  exportables  sector.  Assuming that hiring in  that sector  is
34In what  follows,  all  derivatives  are  evaluated  at initial  values  of wages  and  the  real
exchange  rate equal  to unity.
35Using  (21),  the equilibrium condition  of the market  for informal sector goods can be
rewritten as,  using  (13):
(1-6)  {  W(  n  =  6z {a[YI (z;Wm) + i*B* - T]  + vB*},
which can be solved  for z as  a function of nu and B*, as well  as the exogenous  variables
Wi,  it, and B*.
36See Bhattacharya (1993) for a review of the literature on the Harris-Todaro  model and,
for a more  critical  view,  Stark  (1991).  Note that in the present  setup  the Harris-Todaro
framework  is used to explain migration flows between the (urban) informal  sector and the
(urban)  formal  sector, rather than migration  between the rural and the urban sectors.
34random,  this probability can  be approximated  by the ratio of currently  em-
ployed workers  to those seeking employment,  nd /n'. The expected  wage  in
the informal economy is simply the going wage, because there are no barriers
to entry in that sector.  Thus,  the supply of unskilled workers in the formal
sector evolves  over time according to
*s  {nJ  dWN}  >  0,  (22)
where ,3 denotes the speed of adjustment.  Implicit in the above formulation
is the assumption that workers employed in the informal sector do not engage
in on-the-job search.  As suggested by Agenor (1999),  this assumption can be
motivated  by the existence  of informational  inefficiencies.  The labor market
in many developing countries  is characterized  by the absence of institutions
capable of processing  and providing in a timely manner  relevant information
on job opportunities to potential applicants-particularly  those will low levels
of qualifications.  As a result, job search  for unskilled  workers in the formal
sector  often  requires,  literally  speaking,  waiting  for  employment  offers  at
factory gates.
4.1.6  Government
The government consumes  only imported goods and finances its expenditure
through lump-sum taxes on skilled workers:37
T = gI,  (23)
where  g9  denotes the foreign-currency  value  of government  imports.
4.2  Long-Run Equilibrium
The dynamic  structure  of the  model  is  derived  in Appendix  A.  As  shown
there,  the dynamics of the  model can  be formulated  in terms of the size  of
the unskilled labor force seeking employment in the formal economy,  n' ,  and
the upper-income household's holdings of traded bonds,  B*.  A key feature of
the model is that, as implied by equation  (22), in the long run the unskilled
37In practice, a large proportion of government spending consists of outlays on nontraded
goods and services.  This  cannot be accounted  for  in the present  setting, because  there is
only one home good,  produced in the informal sector.
35wage ratio-the ratio of wages earned  by unskilled workers in the formal and
informal  sectors-must  be  equal  to the inverse  of the  employment  ratio in
the formal economy:
Wm/WN  =  71s/nU  (24)
This equation indicates that, as long as the minimum wage exceeds the in-
formal sector wage (as is the case here),  unskilled unemployment will emerge
in  equilibrium.  As  shown  in  Appendix  A,  in  addition  to  condition  (24),
in  the steady state the  current  account  must  be  in equilibrium.  FRom  the
steady-state solutions of B and n', the equilibrium values of the "short-run"
variables,  the real exchange  rate and the real wage in the informal economy,
can be derived.
The steady-state  equilibrium  of the model  is depicted in Figure  8.  The
locus BB  gives  the  combinations  of  B*  and nu  for  which  bond  holdings
remain constant,  whereas the  locus LL depicts the combinations  of B*  and
ns  for which the size  of the unskilled labor  force seeking employment in the
formal sector does not change over time.  Stability (as discussed in Appendix
A) requires LL to be steeper than BB.  The steady-state equilibrium obtains
at point E.  If the economy's initial position is at, say, point A-characterized
by a negative  differential  between  the expected  wage in the  formal  and the
informal  sectors,  and  a current  account  deficit-the  transition  toward  the
steady state will be characterized  by a fall  in the size of the unskilled labor
force  seeking  employment  in the  formal  sector  and a gradual  reduction  in
holdings of foreign  bonds.  Beyond point  A'  (located  on LL),  the expected
income  differential  turns positive,  because  the continuous  inflow of workers
in the informal sector that occurs during the first phase  of adjustment  puts
downward  pressure  on  wages  there.  The  supply  of  unskilled  labor to  the
formal economy  begins  to increase.  Holdings  of foreign  assets  continue  to
decline,  however,  until the steady-state position is reached at E.
A graphical  illustration of the partial,  long-run equilibrium  of the labor
market,  adapted  from Agenor  (1999),  is presented  in Figure  9.  Panel A de-
picts the demand functions for labor in the formal sector.  The demand curve
for  skilled  labor,  nd,  is  downward-sloping,  because  it is  negatively  related
to ws,  the wage  earned  by skilled  workers.  Skilled  unemployment  is  given
in  Panel  A by the  distance  between  the  fixed  supply  of  skilled  labor,  nrS,
and  the equilibrium  point  on  the  demand  curve  (point  G).  The  demand
curve  for unskilled  labor,  nd,  is also  downward-sloping  because  skilled  and
36unskilled workers are gross complements.  Curve HH in Panel B depicts the
relationship between the (long-run)  supply of unskilled workers in the formal
sector,  nr,  given by  equation  (24),  and  employment of unskilled  workers  in
the formal economy,  nud,  It is derived by using the market-clearing  condition
(21)-taking  z  as given-to eliminate  WN  in (24).  HH has a positive slope
that is greater than unity, as implied by the assumption that Wm  > WN.  The
difference  between  point B  (located on the 45-degree  line)  and B'  (located
on HH) gives unskilled  unemployment.  Curve  VV  is given  by nu - nU; it
is thus  a linear  transformation  of HH.  It  determines  the  supply  of labor
(and thus  actual  employment)  in the informal  economy  (point B").  Given
the labor demand curve in the informal sector, nd, the market-clearing  wage
is determined at point C in Panel  C.  The positive  relationship between the
skilled workers'  wage and the informal sector wage-obtained  by combining
(8),  (21),  and  (24)-is  displayed  as  curve  WW  in  Panel  D.  Thus,  unem-
ployment  of both  categories  of labor-"quasi-voluntary"  unemployment  of
skilled workers  and  "wait"  unemployment  of unskilled  workers-prevails  in
equilibrium.38
4.3  Fiscal Adjustment,  Employment,  and the Poor
The model developed in the previous section can be used to analyze the labor
market and poverty  effects of a variety of macroeconomic  policy shocks that
have  often  been part  of macroeconomic  adjustment  programs  implemented
in developing  countries.  For illustrative purposes,  this paper limits itself to
an analysis of the impact  and steady-state  effects of an increase in lump-sum
taxes.  This experiment  also helps to illustrate the fact that fiscal austerity is
not necessarily  detrimental to the poor (even in the short run),  once general
equilibrium effects are properly accounted for.
4.3.1  Steady-State  Effects
As shown in Figure  10,  a rise in lump-sum taxes T leads in the long run to a
reduction in the stock of foreign bonds held by the upper-income  households
and an increase in the supply of unskilled labor in the formal sector.  The new
equilibrium  is at E', located  at the intersection of the new  curves B'B' and
38Because  there  is no unemployment  benefit  scheme  in the present  framework,  unem-
ployed  workers  in  the  long run  are  implicitly  assumed  to  either  turn  to  a subsistence
activity (home  production)  or to rely on relatives for their survival.
37L'L'.  Intuitively,  the rise in T has two effects.  The first is that it dampens
consumption  of informal  sector  goods  by the  upper-income  household.  At
the initial level of supply of these goods  (that is,  at the initial values  of the
real  exchange  rate and the product  wage in that sector),  the real  exchange
rate must depreciate.  The second effect results from the fact that an increase
in taxes also lowers private  spending  on imports, whereas the real  exchange
rate depreciation  stimulates  exports.  Both  effects  tend to raise  the flow  of
savings of the upper-income  household.  But the flow of savings must be zero
in the long-run equilibrium, implying that interest receipts on foreign bonds
must fall.  And  because  the world  interest  rate  does  not change,  this  can
happen  only through  a reduction  in the stock of foreign  bonds held  by the
rich.
The  depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate lowers  skilled  workers'  effi-
ciency wage in the formal sector,  thereby raising the demand  for both cate-
gories of labor.  The increase  in labor  demand raises  the probability  of em-
ployment  in the formal economy and thus expected income there.  This tends
to  increase  the supply of unskilled  labor in the formal  economy.39 Because
the demand for skilled labor rises, the long-run effect of the shock is a reduc-
tion in the unemployment  rate of skilled workers.  Whether  unemployment of
unskilled workers rises or falls would seem to be a priori ambiguous; both the
supply  of,  and the  demand for,  unskilled  labor rise  in the formal  economy.
As shown in Appendix  A,  however,  it can be established that demand  rises
by more than supply  in relative  terms;  the net outcome  is thus a reduction
in the  rate of unemployment  of unskilled  labor in the  urban formal sector.
The fall  in labor supply in the informal  sector  puts upward pressure  on the
market-clearing  wage CON-thereby outweighing the negative effect of the real
depreciation.40 The product  wage  there  (&Ni)  unambiguously  rises,  which
brings about  the required reduction  in labor demand.  Thus,  informal  sector
wages move in the same direction as output in the formal  economy,  whereas
39Note that the initial,  direct effect  of the real appreciation  is to increase the real wage
(measured in terms of exportables)  by the same  amount, leaving the product  wage in the
informal  sector  constant.  But the increase  in the  supply  of labor in the informal  sector
(which results from the reduction in job seekers in the formal  economy) exerts  an aditional
effect which lowers WN-and thus stimulates the supply of informal  sector goods,  thereby
reinforcing the effects of the initial real appreciation.
40As indicated  in (21),  for a given level  of n&,  WN  must  exactly offset movements  in  z.
However,  WN  depends  also on n' ; the rise in nu puts upward  pressure on informal sector
wages.
38output and employment  in that sector move  in the opposite direction.
4.3.2  Transitional Dynamics
The transitional dynamics associated with the increase in taxes are also illus-
trated in Figure  10.  The impact effects operate  in the same direction  as the
long-run  effects  described  earlier:  a reduction  in  consumption  of domestic
and imported goods  by the  upper-income  household,  a real  depreciation,  a
fall in skilled workers'  wages,  and an increase  in the  demand  for both cate-
gories of workers.  The rise in labor demand raies the probability  of employ-
ment  (and thus expected  income)  in the formal  economy.  The effect  of the
real depreciation  on the product  wage in the informal  economy  is now com-
pletely offset by a reduction in the real wage there; as a result, the differential
between  expected  wages  in the  formal  and  informal  sectors  unambiguously
rises-therefore  raising  on impact  the  flow of labor  in the  formal  economy
(iil(0) > 0).  The reason why impact movements  in z and WN  exactly offset
each  other  is  that  nu  cannot  change  on impact.  As  a result,  the product
wage  in  the informal  sector,  ZWN,  cannot  change  either,  as  can be inferred
from  equation  (20).  Thus,  output and  employment  in  the  informal  sector
remain  also constant on impact.
Although  output  of  exportables  rises  as  a  result  of the  fall  in  skilled
workers'  wage, the net effect of the increase in taxes is a reduction in income
and  savings  by  the  upper-income  household,  and  thus  a  decumulation  in
holdings of foreign bonds (Bo  < 0).  Over time, the adjustment process leads
the  economy  monotonically  from  point  E  to  point  E',  where  the  flow  of
savings  is again zero  and expected  wages  between  the formal  and  informal
sectors are equal.
What happens to poverty rates during the adjustment  process?  Suppose
that  the legal  minimum  wage  is  used  as  the official  poverty  line,  and that
average  income in the  informal  sector,  Yl/n',  is less than wm  at  all times
(given  (11)  and  (12),  this implies that  (WNZ/71)"  <  Wi).  Suppose  also that
the unemployed earn an  (imputed) income  from own production that is less
than win.  The headcount  index measure of poverty,  IH, is thus defined as the
number of workers employed in the informal sector, plus unemployed workers
in the formal economy  (skilled and unskilled),  divided by the size of the labor
force, n:
IH =-{nd + (ns-nd)  +  (nu-n  d) },
39or equivalently,  given that n =  nP +  ns  +  nd:
IH =  1-  n  ).
On impact,  as  indicated earlier,  the supply of unskilled labor  in the for-
mal economy  remains constant, and employment in the informal sector does
not change,  because the product wage there remains constant.  Thus, poverty
falls  as a result of the increase  in the demand for both skilled and unskilled
labor  in the exportables  sector.  This  is  also the  case  in the long  run.  The
analysis  therefore  helps  to illustrate  an  important  point  that  was  alluded
to earlier  in less  formal  terms:  fiscal  austerity  does not  necessarily  have an
adverse  effect on the poor,  neither  in the short  or the long run.  The reason
is that the poverty effects  of macroeconomic  policies in a typical developing-
country context operate through  complex channels  involving changes  in ag-
gregate  demand  and supply in the  formal  and informal  sectors,  as  well  as
changes  in relative  prices and  wages.  Once these  general  equilibrium effects
are  accounted  for,  as  was  done  here,  macroeconomic  adjustment  may  well
benefit the poor by stimulating employment,  and despite downward  pressure
on wages.
5  Empirical  Evidence
The thrust of the foregoing  discussion  is that it is  usually difficult  to draw
clear-cut  theoretical  conclusions regarding the effect of macroeconomic  vari-
ables on poverty  as a resuit of conflicting  effects,  both in the short and the
long run.  Empirical studies  are thus important  to assess whether net effects
are positive or negative.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  however,  empirical  analysis
in this area has been limited.  This section begins by reviewing  some recent
studies.  It then presents some  new econometric  results for a cross-section  of
countries.
5.1  Factual,  Econometric,  and Simulation  Studies
Existing  studies  analyzing  the effect  of macroeconomic  factors  on  poverty
consist of three main types:  factual, econometric, and macro-simulation stud-
ies.  Some of the factual studies focusing on Latin America have suggested,  for
40instance, that the poverty impact of expenditure policies adopted in the con-
text of stabilization  (and structural adjustment)  programs  during the  1980s
has  often  been  negative.41 Another  factual  study  that  attempts  to  assess
the  effect  of macroeconomic  adjustment  on  poverty  in sub-Saharan  Africa
is by Demery and Squire  (1996).  They use the macroeconomic  policy index
developed  by the World  Bank  (1994)  to do so.42  They show that  improve-
ments in macroeconomic  management  (as captured by changes  in the policy
index) are associated with a decline in the incidence of poverty.  More specif-
ically,  Demery and Squire  find that  for the six  African countries  that they
consider-C6te  d'Ivoire,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  and Tanzania-
poverty  fell  in  countries that  improved  their  macroeconomic  policy  regime
and deteriorated  in the one  case  (Cote d'Ivoire)  in which  it did not.43 De-
preciation of the real exchange  rate was a key factor in the macroeconomic
adjustment process;  it also affected  favorably  rural incomes,  benefitting the
poor  both directly and indirectly.
A key problem that factual empirical  studies aimed at  assessing the link
between  macroeconomic  adjustment  programs and poverty face is that they
often  forget the need for a "counterfactual"  analysis.  Too often the process
of adjustment is blamed for the increase in poverty, without considering  what
would have happened  in the absence  of adjustment.
Among the econometric  studies,  Cardoso et al.  (1995)  and Amadeo and
Neri  (1997)  have  found  that inflation  and unemployment  have  an  adverse
effect  on poverty  in Brazil.  Amadeo  and Neri  (1997),  in particular,  found
that although inflation  implies  lower per capita income for all  deciles of the
distribution  of income in Brazil,  its effect on per capita earnings  is lower  for
4'See  Cardoso  (1992)  and  Morley  (1995).  Cardoso,  for  instance,  argued  that  stabi-
lization worsened poverty  in  Brazil because  fiscal  adjustment  led to  a reduction  in  social
expenditures.  The  issue, however,  is quite complex,  as discussed  earlier.
42The  index combines  fiscal,  monetary,  and exchange rate policies.  The fiscal  compo-
nent  of the  index,  for  instance,  is  based  on  the overall  fiscal  balance  and  total revenue.
Scores are  applied to performance  in  each of these  areas and then added  to arrive  at the
fiscal component  of the index.  A similar procedure  is followed  for  the exchange  rate and
monetary  components.  The aggregate  index is a weighted  average of performance  in each
of these three  areas of macroeconomic  management,  with  weights  given  by  the relative
importance  of each component  in determining growth,  as captured  through cross-country
regressions.
43The evidence is based on household sample surveys covering  the  1980s and  1990s.  As
discussed in the first part of this paper, poverty in these countries  is predominantly  rural,
with  much of it occurring  among small-scale  farmers  and among the self-employed.
41the upper-income  households.  Put differently,  inflation has a larger effect on
earnings of the poor than on average per capita income.  The use of time-series
data in a single-country  context is an important avenue of future research in
the analysis  of the role of macroeconomic  factors and other determinants  of
poverty rates.  Romer and Romer  (1998),  for instance,  used time-series tech-
nique to investigate  the impact  of monetary  policy on poverty  in both  the
short run and the long run and found that these run effects go in opposite di-
rections.  The evidence for the United States shows that a cyclical boom (and
lower unemployment)  created by expansionary monetary policy is associated
with improved conditions for the poor in the short run.  Their  cross-section
evidence  from a large sample of countries,  however,  shows that low inflation
and stable aggregate demand growth are associated  with lower poverty in the
long run.  Both the short- and long-run relationships are quantitatively  large,
statistically  significant,  and robust.  But because the cyclical effects  of mon-
etary policy are inherently  temporary, they concluded that monetary  policy
that aims at low inflation and stable aggregate  demand is the most likely to
permanently  improve  conditions  for the poor.  Agenor  (2001)  used a vector
autoregression  approach to analyze the extent to which output shocks  have
an asymmetric effect on the poor in Brazil, while simultaneously controlling
for changes  in the minimum  wage and unemployment.  This type of studies
should be further developed to include (vector) error-correction  models, so as
to distinguish between long-run factors (such as the degree of inequality,  and
public expenditure on education and health)  and short-term macroeconomic
factors.
Some other  studies  have  used  simulation techniques  to examine  the ef-
fect of macroeconomic  policy shocks on poverty.  In particular,  several recent
papers  focusing on sub-Saharan  Africa have  used  computable  general  equi-
librium  (CGE)  models  for this purpose.  Subramanian  (1996),  for  instance,
evaluates the impact of government  policies  (as  well as external  shocks)  on
poverty  in Cameroon.  Sarris  (1996)  examined  the  effects of various  macro-
economic  policy  shocks  (a  20 percent  devaluation,  an increase  in public  in-
vestment  spending financed  by a corresponding  reduction  in public current
expenditure,  and a reduction in public  sector employment)  in a CGE model
for  Tanzania.  All  shocks  in  his study  result  in short-term  declines  in  real
income  for  rich  and  poor  alike.  However,  losses  for  the non-poor  are  sig-
nificantly  higher  than the  losses  incurred  by  the poor  (rural  and  urban),
reflecting the losses  in implicit rents.  In the longer term, with output growth
rates increasing and inflation falling, income gains are significant  for both the
42poor and middle-income  households.  Other studies include Bourguignon,  de
Melo,  and Suwa  (1991)  and Lofgren  (2001).
A  limitation  of  most  existing  CGE  models,  however,  is  that  the  wage
formation mechanisms  that are embedded  in these  models often do not cap-
ture  the complex  intersectoral  relationships  that  are observed  in  practice.
As illustrated  in  the  analytical  model  presented  earlier,  for instance,  feed-
back  effects  between  formal  and  informal  sector  wages  play  a critical  role
in the transmission process  of macroeconomic  shocks  in a context  in which
efficiency  considerations  (or turnover  costs)  matter in the determination  of
formal  sector  wages.  The  structure  of the  labor  market  has  a  major  im-
pact on the transmission  of macroeconomic  shocks  and adjustment  policies
to  economic  activity,  employment,  and  relative  prices;  but  the  treatment
of  this market  in  applied  policy  models  has  often  captured  only  a narrow
set  of  its well-documented  features-such  as  an  economy-wide  rigid  mini-
mum wage  (see for instance  Maechler  and Roland-Host  (1995)).  Insufficient
attention  has  been paid  to  the  macroeconomic  implications  of  alternative
sources  of labor market  segmentation,  differences  in wage  formation  across
various  labor  categories,  inter-sectoral  wage  rigidity  (as opposed  to  aggre-
gate  wage  rigidity),  and  feedback  effects  between  relative  prices  and wage
decisions  by price-setting  firms.  All  of these  features  have  important  im-
plications  for understanding  the  impact of policy  and exogenous  shocks on
poverty.  Labor  market  segmentation,  in particular,  tends  to restrict  labor
mobility  and can be associated  with  persistent  wage  differentials;  these,  in
turn,  may prevent the reallocation  of resources necessary  to cope with exter-
nal and policy-induced  shocks.  Again, because the poor in many developing
countries  generate  a significant  fraction  of their income  from labor  services,
modeling these features of the labor market is crucial for understanding  the
impact of pretty much any type of shocks on poverty in the short and medium
run.
A  detailed  treatment  of the labor  market  is  a  key  feature  of the  Inte-
grated Macroeconomic  Model for Poverty Reduction  (IMMPA)  developed by
Ag6nor,  Izquierdo  and  Fofack  (2001).  Another  characteristic  of IMMPA  is
that  it accounts  explicitly  for the  channels  through  which various  types of
public investment outlays affect  the economy.  Economists  and policymakers
have  long known that different forms of public investment  can have different
effects  on output and employment,  but the channels through which  alterna-
tive forms of public spending operate have seldom been incorporated explic-
itly in applied macroeconomic  models  used for development  policy  analysis.
43In IMMPA,  investment  in infrastructure  (or, rather, the stock of public cap-
ital  in infrastructure)  affects  directly  the level of production  in the private
sector-and  thus the  marginal  productivity  of primary factors  employed  in
that sector-whereas  public investment  in education has a direct impact  on
unskilled  workers'  decision  to  acquire  skills.  This  effect  operates  in  addi-
tion, of course, to movements in relative wages across skill categories and the
initial level  of individual  wealth,  which acts  as a constraining  factor  in the
presence of credit constraints.  IMMPA also allows an analysis  of the poverty
and distributional  effects  of policy and  exogenous  shocks in two ways:  first
by calculating  a set of indicators  (for  income distribution)  based  directly on
the model's simulation results; second,  by linking IMMPA simulation results
to a household  expenditure  survey.  There  are  various  country  applications
under way,  most  notably for Brazil,  Cameroon,  and Senegal.  Many fruitful
lessons  on the impact  of adjustment  on the poor  are likely to emerge  from
them.
5.2  Cross-Country  Econometric  Evidence
This section presents,  in a cross-section  empirical  framework,  some prelimi-
nary results on the relationship between macroeconomic  factors and poverty
in developing  countries.44 The  macroeconomic  variables  examined  include
several  of the  variables  discussed  earlier:  public  expenditure,  inflation,  in-
come  levels  and  output  growth,  and  the  real  exchange  rate.  In  addition,
several structural variables  are also considered.  The estimation method is  a
simple cross-section,  time-series  OLS regression  model with fixed effects.  As
discussed in Appendix  B, the sample is relatively small (at most 52 observa-
tions) and often only one data point is available per  country.
Specifically,  the dependent  variable  is  the logarithm  of the poverty  rate
(LPOV),  measured  by the headcount  index for the population  as  a whole.
The  "basic"  set of explanatory  variables  used in the regressions  are  defined
as follows (see  Appendix B for more precise  definitions):
*  INFL is the inflation rate in consumer  prices;
44Cross-country  regressions  have been the  subject  of criticism  for their  ad hoc specifi-
cation  and  the fragility  of many  of the  results.  See  Temple  (1999,  2000)  for a detailed
discussion  of the problems that arise in this context  and some reasons  why they may be,
nevertheless,  useful tools.
44*  STRA-GDP is the log of the ratio of total subsidies and other current
transfers  over GDP, which  aims at capturing  level effects of changes in
public spending;
*  STRA.CEXP  is  the  log  of  the ratio  of subsidies  and other  current
transfers in percent  of current government  expenditure,  which aims at
capturing  compositional effects of changes  in public spending;
*  ILLITY  is the youth illiteracy rate in percent of the population aged
15-24,  which aims to capture the level of education of the labor force;
*  LHOSPITAL  is  the  log  of  hospital  beds  per  1,000  persons,  which
measures overall health conditions;
*  GDPPC  is  GDP  per capita at PPP exchange  rates,  which captures
the  level of economic  development;
*  REALGR  is the annual growth  rate of GDP per capita,  measured  at
PPP  exchange  rates,  which  can  be  viewed  as  either  a proxy  for  the
rate of return on investment, or as a measure of cyclical movements  in
output;
*  REALEX  is  the annual  rate of change  of the real effective  exchange
rate (defined such that an increase is a depreciation);
*  LURBAN  is the log of the relative  share  of the urban population  in
proportion to total population;
*  LTOT is the log of the terms of trade;
*  VREALXL,  VINFL, and VREALGDP are measures of macroeco-
nomic volatility,  which consist of rolling standard deviations of the real
exchange rate,  inflation,  and real  GDP;
*  OPEN is the ratio  of the sum of imports and  exports  of goods  and
services  in percent  of GDP,  and aims to capture exposure  to external
shocks.
The previous discussion suggests that inflation should have a positive ef-
fect  on  poverty.  The  fiscal  variables,  subsidies  and  current  transfers  as  a
45proportion of GDP, and the relative share of transfers and subsidies in pub-
lic current expenditure,  have  a priori an ambiguous  effect.  The effect  of an
across-the-board cut in transfers and subsidies, for instance, may be negative;
but to the extent that it is accompanied  by better targeting,  there may be
no significant  effect  on the poverty rate.  An increase  in the illiteracy rate is
expected  to be  positively  correlated  with poverty,  whereas  an improvement
in health indicators should be inversely related to poverty.  Both the level of
GDP per capita and its rate of growth  are expected to be negatively  corre-
lated with the poverty rate.  The effect  of a real exchange  rate  depreciation
is in general ambiguous;  it is likely to lead to a reduction in poverty if it ben-
efits small farmers  in the tradable  sector,  as is the case in many low-income
developing  countries.  A  higher rate  of urbanization  also  has in  general  an
ambiguous  effect  on aggregate  poverty; to the extent that rural-to-urban  mi-
gration translates into greater access to public services in urban areas, it may
lower  poverty; but to the extent that  inflows  of workers  in the  urban sector
lead  to  an  excess  supply  of labor  in  the  informal  sector  and  lower  wages
there,  it may  increase  poverty.  An  improvement  in the terms  of trade may
reduce poverty if it represents an increase  in the relative price of agricultural
commodities  (thereby benefiting  small farmers  in rural areas) or a fall in the
price  of imported  consumption  goods  (benefiting  mostly  households  in ur-
ban areas).  An increase in macroeconomic  volatility  (associated with output
shocks,  inflation,  or fluctuations  in the  real  exchange  rate)  is  expected  to
increase  poverty,  possibly through  its adverse  effect on growth,  as  discussed
earlier.  Finally,  the degree  of openness  has a priori  an ambiguous  effect  on
poverty.
Table  1 summarizes  some  of the basic empirical  results.  They indicate
that  inflation,  the terms of trade, the degree  of openness,  the urbanization
ratio, the illiteracy rate and the volatility  of inflation,  do not have a statisti-
cally significant  impact on poverty.45 In particular,  inflation (despite having
the  correct  sign)  has no  discernible  effect  on poverty,  in contrast  to earlier
results by Agenor  (1999) and Easterly and Fischer (2001).  The fact that the
degree  of openness  has  no significant  effect  on poverty may  result from the
fact that greater  access  to imported  capital  goods  leads firms to substitute
away  from  unskilled labor in the production  process,  as noted  earlier.  The
45I also  tried to interact  the degree  of openness  with the terms  of trade, on the ground
that in more  open economies,  changes in the  terms of trade may have  a larger impact on
the poor.  The variable  turned out also to be insignificant.
46fiscal  variables  and the  volatility  of real  GDP  were  not  only  insignificant,
they also had the wrong sign.  Accordingly,  they were dropped  from the re-
gressions.  It is  difficult to make much  of the fact that public transfers  and
subsidies are not significant in the regressions;  the reason  is that our variable
may  not be  adequate,  because  it  does  not  measure  very  well  what  are the
subsidies and transfers that actually go to the poor (it includes,  for instance,
transfers from the government  to private and public enterprises).
By contrast, the number of hospital beds has the correct sign and is highly
significant in a number of regressions.  Both the level of real GDP per capita
and its growth rate have the expected negative sign and are highly significant
in all regressions.  The rate of depreciation of the real exchange  rate also has
a strong,  negative  effect  on poverty,  which  is consistent  with the  view that
improvements in the relative price of tradables  benefit farmers producing ex-
portables in the agricultural  sector.  The volatility of the real exchange  rate
is also  highly  significant,  indicating that  macroeconomic  instability  has an
adverse impact  on poverty-possibly  through  its effect  on income  distribu-
tion,  as noted earlier.  Finally,  the fixed effects  (which are  not reported here
to save space)  are all statistically significant,  suggesting that country-specific
factors are important  in determining the behavior of poverty rates.
Table  2  extends  the  analysis  in  Table  1 to  account  for  the possibility
of asymmetric  output shocks  in both the level  of real GDP  per capita and
its growth  rate.  Specifically,  observations  on  the  level  and  growth  rate  of
GDP per capita are split  into two  sub-samples.  In both cases,  two  dummy
variables,  DUMMYPOS  and  DUMMYNEG,  are  created;  for  the  level
of GDP  per  capita,  the  first  is equal  to  1 times GDPPC when  GDPPC
at  period  t  is  higher  than  GDPPC at  time t  - 1 (and  0  otherwise),  and
the second is equal to 1 times  GDPPC  when GDPPC  at period t is  lower
than  GDPPC at  time  t  - 1.  For  the  growth  rate,  the  first  is  equal  to
1 times  REALGR  when REALGR  is  positive  (and  0  otherwise),  and  the
second  equal  to  1 times  the  absolute  value  of REALGR  when  REALGR
is negative  (and 0 otherwise).  The  results show  first that  all the variables
that were  significant in Table  1 remain so;  in particular,  real  exchange rate
depreciations  and  better health  conditions  tend  to lower  poverty,  whereas
macroeconomic  volatility tends  to increase  it.  In addition,  an improvement
in the terms  of trade tends now  to significantly  lower poverty.  The  results
also show that there is no evidence of asymmetric effect  of the level of GDP
per capita on poverty:  both variables have coefficients that are significant and
statistically  indistinguishable.  By contrast,  positive  growth rates of output
47have  no  statistically  significant  effect  on  poverty,  whereas  higher  negative
growth  rates  affects  significantly  and  adversely  the  poor.  A similar  result
was  obtained by De Janvry and Sadoulet  (2000)  using a more parsimonious
regression  framework.  This  asymmetric  effect  is very  important.  As noted
by  De Janvry  and Sadoulet  (2000,  p.  284),  to the extent  that the growth-
poverty correlation  results mainly from episodes of negative growth rates and
increases in poverty, it may lead to erroneous predictions about the potential
of growth-oriented  policies  to reduce poverty.
Table  3  extends the  results  of Tables  1 and  2  in two  directions.  First,
a  measure  of  inequality,  the Gini  coefficient,  taken from  Dollar  and  Kraay
(2001)  is  added to the regression.  Bourguignon  (2000)  recently emphasized
the importance of including a measure of inequality as a regressor in estimat-
ing the impact  of growth  and standards  of living.on  poverty;  the  previous
discussion  also  suggests  the  same  approach.  Second,  to  test  for  possible
endogeneity  problems  with  respect  to  income,  both  the  level  and the rate
of  growth  of  GDP  per  capita  are  lagged  by  one  period.  The  regressions
show that the previous  results remain by and large unchanged;  health condi-
tions, and improvements in the terms of trade, tend to lower poverty, whereas
macroeconomic volatility and a higher degree of inequality tend to increase it.
However,  the rate of depreciation  of the real exchange rate becomes insignif-
icant when  the sample  is split to test for  asymmetric  effects.  Furthermore,
the evidence  suggests  again  an  asymmetric  effect  on the  rate  of growth of
income per capita, not in the level of that variable.  In line with the previous
characterization  of the sources  of asymmetry,  a possible  explanation  of the
latter result is that the rate of growth acts as a proxy for the rate of return on
capital.  In recessions  (or periods of negative growth), the perceived degree of
uncertainty  about  future profitability  increases,  which leads  firms to adopt
a "wait  and  see"  attitude in a  recovery  (at least  in the early phases),  as  a
result of irreversibility  effects.
The  foregoing  results  are,  without  a doubt,  very suggestive.  Neverthe-
less,  it is  important  to note that  data limitations  and the relatively  small
number of degrees of freedom limit their reliability.  For instance, it would be
preferable to have a more accurate estimate of the share of transfers going to
poor households  only,  as  opposed to households  in general.  Also,  measured
poverty  rates  in the  sample may  be overstated  to the extent  that the esti-
mate of income reflects only market  or market-related  activities.  Expanding
the database  used here would  allow expanding  the  range  of variables to be
tested-such as for instance the impact of inequality in assets,  as opposed to
48income.  In the same vein it would be useful to develop a measure  of financial
openness  (in addition to the trade openness index used in the regressions)  in
order to  assess the impact  of international  financial  integration  on poverty.
Finally,  it should be noted that the role of the labor market is only implicit
(or indirect)  in the regression framework  used above.  Extending the analysis
to account explicitly for labor market variables  (such as changes in unemploy-
ment, which are only imperfectly correlated with changes  in output growth)
would allow a more precise assessment  of its importance in the transmission
of macroeconomic  policy to poverty.
6  Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to examine analytically  and empirically
the various  channels  through  which  stabilization  policies  affect  poverty  in
developing  countries,  with  a particular  emphasis  on  the  role  of the  labor
market.  Macroeconomic  policies must,  of course,  be evaluated  in  terms  of
their macroeconomic  objectives;  in addition,  however, it is important to un-
derstand their short-term impact on poverty.  This issue has been the subject
of renewed interest in studies of economic adjustment in developing countries.
The first part of the paper provided a brief review of the recent evidence
on poverty,  and highlighted the large differences  between and within regions
of the developing  world.  The second part provided  an analytical overview  of
the various  channels through which macroeconomic  policies affect the poor.
It was argued, in particular, that a reduction in government  expenditure  on
transfers and subsidies  (measured either as a proportion of GDP or as a share
of total spending)  does not necessarily  hurt the poor if it is accompanied  by
a better targeting of benefits.  It was also  pointed out that there are several
factors suggesting that  macroeconomic  adjustment  might  benefit  the  poor.
If the tradable  goods sector  is labor  intensive,  the poor  will  gain  from the
relative price shifts associated with a real exchange rate depreciation.  At the
same time, a reduction in (policy-induced)  macroeconomic  volatility is likely
to lead to an increase in savings and investment rate, and thus be conducive
to  growth.  However,  these  predictions  must  be  qualified  because  various
other  factors may mitigate the positive  impact  of adjustment  on the  poor.
Structural  characteristics  (such as  the extent  of price  and  wage  flexibility,
the degree  of inter-sectoral  mobility of the unskilied  labor force,  the extent
to which  the poor  consume  tradable  goods,  and  the extent  to  which they
49are directly affected by cuts  in public expenditure)  vary considerably. across
countries  and  make it  necessary  to address  these issues  on a case  by case
basis.
The third part presented  an analytical  framework that captures some of
the main features of the urban labor market in developing countries-a large
informal sector, efficiency  wages and minimum wage legislation in the formal
economy,  and imperfect  mobility of the unskilled  labor force  across  sectors.
Unemployment  of both skilled  and  unskilled  workers  was  shown  to emerge
in equilibrium,  despite  wage  flexibility  in  the informal  sector.  Skilled  un-
employment  emerges because  the  opportunity  cost of leisure is  low and/or
the reservation  wage  is higher  than  the going wage  in  the informal  sector,
whereas unskilled unemployment  results from  "wait"  or "queuing"  consider-
ations in the tradition of Harris  and Todaro  (1970).  The model was used to
study the macroeconomic  effects of fiscal  adjustment,  namely,  an increase in
lump-sum taxes  on upper-income  households.  The  analysis suggested that
in the  long  run  this policy  leads  to a real  exchange  rate depreciation  and
lower unemployment  of both categories of labor.  It also lowers poverty (with
the poor defined as unemployed  workers and those employed in the informal
sector).  This experiment  serves  to illustrate  the  importance  of accounting
for general equilibrium effects  in assessing  the impact  of macroeconomic  ad-
justment  on poverty;  whereas the direct,  partial equilibrium effect  of higher
taxes is to reduce aggregate demand and employment, the changes in relative
prices and  wages  that result  from the  initial response  of the economy  may
translate into economy-wide  movements  in labor demand and output.  These
movements  may operate  in opposite direction to the initial effects-so much
so that a seemingly  adverse shock may end up being beneficial  for the poor.
The fourth part provided a brief overview of some of the existing empirical
studies focusing on the effect  of macroeconomic  adjustment  on poverty,  and
presented  some  cross-country  econometric  results  focusing  on  some  of the
factors identified  in the  previous  sections-such  as output  growth,  the real
exchange rate, government  expenditure  (distinguishing both level effects and
compositional effects,  as measured by the share of subsidies  and other trans-
fers in total public expenditure),  inflation,  and macroeconomic volatility-as
well  as structural  factors  (degree  of urbanization,  health conditions,  illiter-
acy rate,  and the degree of income inequality).  Although the results should
be  treated  with  some  caution  given  the  relatively  short  sample  size,  they
suggest that higher levels of per capita  income,  real exchange  rate deprecia-
tions, better health conditions, and improvements  in the terms of trade lower
50poverty,  whereas  greater  income inequality,  higher illiteracy,  and macroeco-
nomic volatility (as measured by the volatility of the real exchange rate) tend
to increase it.  In addition, real output growth per capita was found to have
an asymmetric  effect:  positive  growth rates  are not statistically  significant,
whereas higher negative growth rates are significant and tend to raise poverty.
Ignoring  this asymmetric  effect  may lead to overestimating  the potential  of
growth-oriented  policies to reduce poverty.
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in various directions.
The cross-country  econometric  results  presented  here could  be extended  to
explicitly account  for the structure of the labor market and the role of labor
market  variables  in the  transmission  of macroeconomic  policy  shocks.  For
instance,  labor  market  regulations,  by  reducing  the  demand  for  unskilled
labor  in the  formal  economy,  may tend to raise  poverty  in both  the  short
and the  long term.  Fallon  and  Lucas  (1993),  for  instance,  showed that  in
Zimbabwe job security regulations  (including restrictions  on firms'  ability to
dismiss  redundant  workers)  reduced  employment  by  increasing  adjustment
costs and reducing efficiency.  More generally, the evidence appears to suggest
that  countries  that  have  managed  to  reduce  poverty dramatically  have  all
typically  been able to increase  the demand  for  unskilled  labor  rapidly.  To
the extent that labor market imperfections hamper the creation of (unskilled)
jobs,  there  may  be  a  close  link  between  reforms  aimed  at  improving  the
functioning of the labor market  and policies  aimed at alleviating  poverty.
Another  potentially  fruitful  area of research  is  related to the  degree  of
inter-sectoral mobility of the labor force.  As noted earlier, the speed of labor
reallocation  plays  a  crucial  role  in understanding  the  impact  of shocks  on
poverty  and the  labor  market.  However,  the  available  evidence  on the  de-
gree of labor mobility across  sectors  in developing  countries  remains rather
scant.  In practice,  labor  mobility depends  on  a variety  of factors,  such  as
employment protection regulations  (most notably administrative restrictions
on hiring, plant closure and layoffs of permanent labor, and the generosity of
severance payments)  and other microeconomic  considerations,  such as prox-
imity  and  family  ties.  Fallon  and  Riveros  (1989)  took the  fact  that wage
differentials  during the early  1980s  tended  to widen  in favor  of expanding
(tradable)  sectors  in the urban  sector  in Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Mex-
ico,  and  Uruguay  as  indicating  less than perfect  labor  mobility.  However,
differences  in the pattern of wage  formation  across  industries  may well ex-
plain such movements.  There  is a need therefore to extend research on these
51issues.46 One  possibility  would  be to  follow  the  approach  of Dickens  and
Lang  (1985),  which  relies  on switching  regression  analysis.47 The  Dickens-
Lang method could be used to test for the presence  of non-economic  barriers
to formal sector employment.  Their approach suggests postulating a mecha-
nism for allocation of workers between  the formal and informal sectors in the
absence  of rationing,  based on workers'  employment  choices.  Assuming that
workers have perfect information and would behave so as to maximize utility
over their lifetime,  then they would choose formal  sector employment  if the
net present  value  of their  income stream  in  the formal  economy  exceeded
that of the informal sector.  This proposition can be tested by a series of con-
straints on the switching regression.48 But in practice,  assessing the degree of
mobility between  the formal and  informal sectors in developing  countries is
difficult  because data on migration flows between these sectors are generally
not  available.  However,  the model developed  earlier  suggests that the ratio
of formal sector wages  (for workers with low qualifications)  to informal sector
wages can be a useful empirical  proxy.  The model,  in fact,  suggests an am-
biguous effect of the wage differential  on poverty,  to the extent that the poor
are viewed  as consisting  of all workers  in the informal  sector  as  well as the
openly  unemployed  in the formal  economy.49 A fall  in the  formal-informal
wage ratio, for instance,  increases the flow  of (low-skilled)  workers  to the in-
formal sector.  To the extent that these workers were previously unemployed,
poverty would not change;  but to the extent that they were initially employed
in the formal sector, poverty would naturally increase.  Similarly,  a rise in the
wage ratio would have an ambiguous effect on poverty because those workers
who move to the formal  sector to seek a job there may well  be unsuccessful
and end up joining the ranks of the unemployed.  What the foregoing discus-
46Note that in the analytical  framework  described  earlier,  the size of the labor supply
seeking employment  in the formal  economy  does not depend on the speed  of adjustment
in the long run;  only the transitional  dynamics  are affected.
47Leontaridi  (1998)  provides  a more  detailed discussion  of the Dickens-Lang  approach.
4'Essentially,  if the hypothesis of workers'  free choices  of sectors  is to be accepted,  and
tastes for the non-pecuniary  aspects of employment  are independent  of individual  charac-
teristics  (such as the place of residence,  marital status, the  level of education, and so on),
then one would expect that the coefficients  of the variables  describing these characteristics
in the switching equation to be equal to the coefficients  in the two wage equations.  Failure
to accept  this restriction  can be viewed  as prima facie evidence  of non-economic barriers
to employment  in the formal sector.
49This discussion  assumes that the employment probability  in the formal economy  does
not change significantly  in the short  run.
52sion  suggests,  nevertheless,  is  that adding  the formal-informal  sector  wage
ratio as an independent variable  in the type of poverty regressions  presented
earlier may  be one  way to capture,  with appropriate  auxiliary assumptions,
the effect  of intersectoral labor  flows on poverty rates.
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Solution  and Dynamic  Form of the Model
The first step in solving the model is to determine the short-run market-
clearing  solutions of the real exchange  rate and the real wage in the informal
sector (measured  in terms of the price of exports).  To do so,  substitute (10)
in (14)  to give
CR =  a[Yj(z) + i*B* - TI  + vB*.
This equation can be written as
CR  =  0(+I B*; T)-  (Al)
where
Z =  a(PY0/8Z),  B*  =  ai  +  V,  XT  =  -a.
A real depreciation,  an increase in the stock of traded bonds, or a fall  in
taxes stimulate consumption  of the rich.
Similarly,  substituting  (13)  in  (17)  yields
Cp = z 1 Yk(wNz)-  (A2)
Using the equilibrium solution  for WN,  equation  (21),  in (A2),  and using
(Al), the equilibrium condition of the market for nontraded goods, equation
(19),  can be written as
YN[WN(z,  nU)zj = 6z[O(z, B*; T) + Cp],
that is, using  (A2):
YJT[WN(Z, n')ZJ =  - z_S(z, B*; T).  (A3)
Equation  (A3) can be solved for the equilibrium real exchange,  z:
Z = O(nu, B*; T),  (A4)
54where
Ont  =-Q-1YNs'19WN  6(ai*  + v)  __a  _
anu  t3nu )  B  Q(1  6)Q(1
and,  with a '`'  denoting  a steady-state  value:
Q  =  YN(l  +  a  )WN  6(ER  +  Oz),
that is, because the first term in the expression  for  Q  is zero from  (21):
Q =  6[ER + a(  AXI)]  < °. _6  OYZ
An  increase  in  taxes,  for  instance,  lowers  consumption  of  the  upper-
income household and creates excess supply in the market  for informal sector
goods.  The real exchange  rate must therefore depreciate  to restore  equilib-
rium.
Substituting this result in the informal labor market equilibrium condition
(equation  (21))  yields:
WN  =  K(n'  ,B*; T).  (A5)
where
O'ns  iWN Ks  O(iWN ECu=  (-tZ)O9nU  +  (  in  )X
O  z  u  9u
KB-  =  (aN)OB.  =  -OB-,  KT  =  a  )OT  =-OT
An  increase  in  the  supply  of unskilled  labor  in  the  formal  sector,  for
instance, creates an excess demand for labor in the informal economy, thereby
putting upward pressure on wages there.
The second  step is  to substitute  (10)  for  Yx,  (A4)  for  z  in the  result-
ing equation,  and re-write the upper-income  household's  budget constraint,
equation  (15),  as
=  (1  - a) [Yx [4(nu,  B*; T)] +  i*B* - T] - vB*.
55This equation can be written as
B* = G(nu, B*; T),  (A6)
with
u  (1-  (  a)(ay!
CT  (1  -c)[(  5ŽZi-)OT -11  =  -(1-  ) [  CER  + a(Y/ lz)]
and
GB.  =  (1 - Q)[i* +  (fX)OB.]  -V
that is
GB.=(la)i*  I  ai('9YPO1'z)  _ - [  +  (1-a(Y1z
a  R + at(aYllaz)]  [  RlaR8  /z)]
(A7)
In general,  the  sign of GB.  is indeterminate.  In what  follows  it will be
assumed  that the  wealth  effect,  as  measured  by  v,  is  sufficiently  large  to
ensure that GB.  < 0.50  Note also that an increase in T, for nu and B* given,
lowers the flow of savings  (so that B* <  0).
The last step is to determine the flow changes in labor supply to the formal
sector.  Substituting (8) in the second equation  of (9) yields  nd  =  nd (Z' Wm),
that is, using  (A4):
= L(n,  B*; T).
50Equation  (A7)  shows  that if v  =  0, GB.  > 0.  It  can be verified  by  looking  at  the
stability conditions given  below that in this  case the model is unstable  because the roots
of the matrix  of coefficients  are  of opposite sign.  Note also that the higher a is,  the more
likely  the condition GB. < 0 will be satisfied.  In the particular  case where  or = 1, GB.  =
-V.
56Substituting this result, together with  (A5)  for  WN  in (22)  yields
S=  {wmL(nUB  B*;  T)  }
that is
hu = 04,(n'  , B*; T)  (A8)
where
fiWm  U  nd  W  WMLBL
'h  s  Ltu  Ihs j  /nu  F  IM
XT  =  n  -T,
fiu
Equation (A8)  shows,  in particular, that an increase in ns  tends to lower
unskilled  migration  flows towards  the formal  economy,  as  a  result  of three
effects.  First,  it  lowers  the  supply  of labor  in the  informal  sector-which
tends to increase the market-clearing  wage, and thus the opportunity cost of
queueing.  Second,  it lowers the demand for unskilled labor in the formal sec-
tor; the reason is that by increasing wages in the informal  economy,  it lowers
the supply of informal sector goods,  thereby requiring a real appreciation to
maintain  equilibrium  in the market  for  these goods  (see  (A4)).  As a result,
the efficiency  wage  increases,  thereby reducing  the demand  for both skilled
and unskilled workers.  Third, it lowers (at a given level of the demand for la-
bor in the formal economy) the employment  probability.  The last two effects
combine to reduce the expected wage  in the formal sector.  All  three effects
combine therefore  to reduce migration  flows from the informal  sector to the
formal economy.  Note also that an increase in T, for nu and B*  given, raises
the flow of unskilled workers seeking employment in the formal economy  (so
that  hn  (O)  > 0).
Equations  (A6) and (A8) represent the dynamic equations of the system.
Using a linear approximation  around the steady state yields
[&  ]  'n'  [  G  ]I  [ nu  -u  ]  (A9) B*  Gnlu  GB  LB* -Bf* 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for (A9) to be (locally)  stable are that
the matrix  of coefficients  has
57*  a negative  trace  (O3iII  +  GB.  < 0),  which  guarantees  at  least  one
negative root;
*  a  positive determinant,  which ensures  that the roots are of the  same
sign:
A = /3(GB.'ql,&  - GnuB-) > 0.
The first condition is always satisfied.  The second condition  requires,  as
shown  in  Figure  4,  that the slope  of LL  be steeper  in absolute  value  than
the slope  of BB.
Using (A6)  and  (A8),  it can  readily be shown  that a rise in T increases
nu and lowers  B*  in the long run:
diib  = /('IB.GT  - 'ITGB.)  > O  dB*  3(q'TGnu  - 'n',GT)  < 0
dT  A  dT  A
Using these results,  it can be established from  (A4) and (A5) that in the
long  run  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciates  (dz/dT  >  0)  and that wages
in the informal  sector rise  (dCON/dT > 0).  The first effect  implies that the
demand  for unskilled labor in the formal  sector rises  as well (diid/dT > 0).
FRom  (24),  fi  =  WmnfdI/wN.  The  effect  of T on  the steady-state  level  of
unskilled  unemployment  in the formal sector is thus
d(nu - i)  d  Wm  d4  Wm  u dwN  d  d
dT  (WN  dT  W2  dT  dT)'
that is
d(fi  -u)  Wm_  dhd  Wmfd  dCIWN
dT  W  N  dT  WrN  dT
Because  diid/dT > 0 and Wm/WN  > 1, the first term on the right-hand
side is positive.  The second term is negative, because dwN/dT > 0. Thus, the
impact of higher taxes on the level of unskilled unemployment is ambiguous.
The effect  on the unskilled unemployment  rate in the urban formal sector is
d  (nS  )  d (-U  )5
dT  fns  dT  fisu
58that is,  using (24):
d  CD N\ 1 dLIN 0
T(  -g  -)  = -Wmld  < 0.
Thus,  the unemployment  rate  falls unambiguously  in the long run,  im-
plying that labor  demand  rises  by more than  labor supply in  proportional
terms.
59Appendix  B
Data Sources  and Country Lists
Regressions  with the complete  sample are  based on the  following  list of
countries  (years  of  observation  in parentheses):  Algeria  (1988,  1995),  Ar-
gentina  (1991,  1993),  Bangladesh  (1992,  1996),  Benin  (1995),  Brazil  (1990,
1996,  1998),  Burundi  (1990),  Cambodia  (1994,  1997),  Chad  (1996),  Chile
(1992,  1994),  Colombia  (1991,  1992),  Dominican  Republic  (1989,  1992),
Ecuador  (1994),  Egypt  (1996),  El  Salvador  (1992),  Gambia  (1992),  Ghana
(1992),  Guatemala (1989), Guinea (1994), Guinea-Bissau (1991), Haiti (1987),
Honduras (1992, 1993), India (1992,  1994), Indonesia (1987,  1990,  1996, 1998-
99),  Jamaica  (1992),  Jordan  (1991,  1997),  Kenya  (1992),  Lesotho  (1993),
Madagascar  (1994),  Malawi  (1991),  Malaysia  (1989),  Mauritania  (1990),
Mauritius  (1992),  Mexico  (1988),  Morocco  (1985,  1991,  1999),  Nepal (1996),
Nicaragua (1993),  Niger (1992),  Nigeria (1985, 1992), Pakistan (1990), Panama
(1997),  Paraguay  (1991),  Peru  (1986,  1991,  1994,  1997),  Philippines  (1985,
1991,  1994,  1997),  Rwanda  (1993),  Sierra  Leone  (1989),  Sri  Lanka  (1986,
1991,  1996),  Tanzania  (1991),  Thailand  (1990,  1992),  Togo  (1989),  Trinidad
and Tobago  (1992),  Tunisia  (1985,  1990),  Uganda  (1998),  Venezuela  (1989),
Yemen  (1992),  Zambia  (1991,  1993),  Zimbabwe  (1991).
The observations  on  the Gini  coefficient  obtained  from the  database  of
Dollar  and Kraay  (2001)  are  as  follows  (years  of observation  in  parenthe-
ses):  Algeria  (1988,  1995),  Bangladesh  (1992,  1995),  Brazil  (1990,  1996-
97),  Cambodia  (1997),  Chile  (1992,  1994),  Colombia  (1991),  Dominican
Republic  (1989,1992),  Ecuador  (1994),  Egypt  (1991),  El  Salvador  (1989),
Gambia  (1992),  Ghana  (1992),  Guatemala  (1989),  Guinea  (1994),  Guinea-
Bissau  (1991),  Honduras  (1992-93),  India  (1992,  1994),  Indonesia  (1987,
1990,  1996,  1999),  Jamaica  (1992),  Jordan  (1991,  1997),  Kenya  (1992),  Lao
PDR  (1992),  Lesotho  (1993),  Madagascar  (1993),  Malawi  (1993),  Malaysia
(1989),  Mauritania  (1988),  Mauritius  (1991),  Mexico  (1989),  Morocco  (1984,
1991),  Nepal  (1996),  Nicaragua  (1993),  Niger  (1992),  Nigeria  (1985,  1993),
Pakistan  (1991),  Panama (1997),  Paraguay  (1991),  Peru (1986,  1994,  1997),
Philippines  (1985,  1991,  1994,  1997),  Sierra Leone  (1989),  Sri Lanka  (1985,
1990,  1995),  Tanzania  (1991),  Thailand  (1990,  1992),  Trinidad  and Tobago
(1992), Tunisia (1985,  1990),  Venezuela  (1989), Yemen (1992),  Zambia (1991,
1993),  Zimbabwe  (1990).
For  several  countries  in the sample,  the  year of observation  of the Gini
coefficient  taken from the Dollar-Kraay database does not correspond  to the
60year  of observation  of  the  poverty  headcount  rate  available  in the  World
Bank's  LDB  database  and used  for the regressions  in  Tables  1 and  2.  We
therefore  used the  closest  year for  which  the Gini  coefficient  was  available.
This  gives  the  following  approximations,  with the first  year  in parentheses
indicating the poverty observation:  Bangladesh (1995,  Gini observation used
for  1996),  Brazil  (1997,  Gini observation  used for  1998),  Egypt  (1991,  Gini
observation  used  for  1996),  El  Salvador  (1989,  Gini  observation  used  for
1992),  Lao PDR (1992,  Gini observation  used for  1993),  Madagascar  (1993,
Gini  observation  used  for  1994),  Malawi  (1993,  Gini  observation  used  for
1991),  Mauritania  (1988,  Gini observation  used for  1990),  Mauritius  (1991,
Gini  observation  used  for  1992),  Mexico  (1989,  Gini  observation  used  for
1988),  Morocco (1984,  Gini observation used for 1985),  Niger (1992,  Gini ob-
servation used for 1993), Sri Lanka  (1985,  1990,  1995,  Gini observations used
respectively  for  1986,  1991,  1996),  and  Zimbabwe  (1990,  Gini  observation
used for 1991).
The  list  and sources  of the  variables  used  in  the  regressions  shown  in
Tables  1 to  3 is as follows:
*  LPOV: Log of the poverty index.  Source:  World Bank LDB Database.
*  INFL: Inflation rate  in consumer  prices.  Source:  2001  World Devel-
opment Indicators CD-ROM  (WDI).
*  STRA-GDP is the log of the ratio of total subsidies  and other current
transfers  over GDP.  Source:  WDI.
*  STRA.CEXP  is  the  log  of the  ratio of  subsidies  and  other  current
transfers in percent  of current government  expenditure.  Source:  WDI.
*  ILLITY:  Youth  total illiteracy  rate in  percent  of people  ages  15-24.
Source:  WDI.
*  LHOSPITAL: Log of hospital beds per  1,000 people.  Source:  WDI.
*  GDPPC: GDP per capita at PPP exchange rates.  Source:  WDI.51
51In WDI,  PPP  GDP is defined  as gross  fdomestic product  converted  to international
dollars  using purchasing  power parity  rates.  An  interntational  dollar  has the same pur-
chasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.  PPP exchange  rates
provide  a standard  measure  allowing  comparison  of real  price  levels  between  countries.
The PPP conversion factors used in WDI are derived from price surveys conducted by the
International  Comparison  Program  (ICP).
61*  REALGR:  the annual  growth  rate  of GDP  per capita,  measured  at
PPP exchange  rates.  Source:  WDI.
*  DUMMYPOS: Dummy equals  1 times GDPPC  (REALGR)  when-
ever  GDPPC  at  t is  greater  than  GDPPC at t - 1 (REALGR  is
positive),  0 otherwise.
*  DUMMYNEG: Dummy equals  1 times GDPPC (the absolute value
of REALGR)  whenever GDPPC  at t is lower than GDPPC  at t - 1
(REALGR  is negative,  0 otherwise.
*  REALEX:  Percentage change  in real effective  exchange rate.  A rise is
a depreciation.  Source:  International  Financial  Statistics, IMF.
*  OPEN: Ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services
in percent of GDP. Source:  WDI.
*  LURBAN:  Urban population in percent  of total.  Source:  WDI.
*  LTOT: Log of terms of trade index.  Source:  WDI.
*  VREALXL:  Volatility  measure  of  real  effective  exchange  rate.  It
equals  the  ratio  of the  standard  deviation  of real  effective  exchange
rate at t, t - 1, t - 2, t - 3 to the average  of it for the same period.
*  VINFL:  Volatility  measure  of  inflation.  It  equals  the  ratio  of the
standard deviation of inflation at t, t - 1, t - 2, t -3  to the average  of
it for the same period.
*  VREALGDP:  Volatility  measure  of real GDP  per  capita.  It equals
the ratio of the standard deviation  of real GDP per capita at t, t - 1,
t - 2, t - 3 to the average  of it for the same period.
*  GINI: Gini coefficient.  Source:  Dollar and Kraay  (2001).
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69Table I
Developing Countries: Determinants of the Poverty Rate
(OLS with fixed effects)
Dependent variable:  Log of headcount poverty index
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
INFL  0.272  0.227  0.256  0.333  0.343  0.208  0.251  0.240
(1.262)  (1,001)  (1.133)  (1.359)  (1.418)  (1.096)  (1.038)  (0.973)
ILLITY  -0.118  -0.345  -0.191  -0.189
(-0.798)  (-1.407)  (-1.155)  (-1.103)
LHOSPITAL  -0.408  -0.666  40.575  -0.673  -0.387  -0.788  -0.697
(-1.265)  (-2.094)  (-1.809)  (-2.511)  (-1.206)  (-2.788)  (-2.220)
GDPPC  -1.246  -0.857  -1.021  -1.069  -1.019  -1.215  -0.814  -0.859
(-2.624)  (4.360)  (-3.182)  (-3.743)  (-3.824)  (-2.810)  (-4.582)  (4.345)
REALGR  -1.216  -1.159  -1.065  -1.309  -1.409  -1.271  -1.482  -1.388
(-2.779)  (-1.922)  (-2.326)  (-2.402)  (-3.135)  (-3.243)  (-3.346)  (-2.579)
REALEX  -0.501  -0.552  -0.474  -0.560  -0.541  -0.502  -0.549  -0.566
(4.776)  (4.393)  (-5.079)  (4.206)  (4.176)  (-4.964)  (-4.020)  (-4.045)
OPEN  0.124  0.093  0.088
(0.628)  (0.507)  (0.494)
LURBAN  0.996  1.287
(0.965)  (1.320)
LTOT  -0.142  -0.116  -0.144  -0.057  -0.150  -0.174  -0.227  -0.140
(-1.050)  (4.541)  (-0.810)  (-0.266)  (-0.916)  (-1.191)  (-1.252)  (-0.689)
VREALXL  1.169  1.329  1.319  1.321  1.354  1.283  1.548  1.519
(4,244)  (5.018)  (4.156)  (5.028)  (5.142)  (5.002)  (6.798)  (7.044)
VINFL  0.031  0.105
(0.419)  (1.149)
Adj.  R2  0.901  0.904  0.898  0.903  0.908  0.913  0.911  0.907
Number of obs.  74  75  76  74  74  75  75  75
StandardErrorof  0.159  0.159  0.163  0.158  0.154  0.151  0.152  0.156
Regression
Note: INFL is the annual  change in the consumer price index.  ILLITY is the log of the illiteracy rate for the youth in percent of total population. LHOSPITAL is the log of the
number of beds per 1000 people. GDPPC is the log of the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity). REALGR is the annual  growth of GDP per capita (purchasing power parity).
REALEX is the annual  change in the real effective exchange rate index (a rise is depreciation).  OPEN is the log of the ratio of the sum of irnports and exports of goods and
services to GDP (all in nominal terms). LURBAN is the log of the urban population in percent of  total population.  LTOT is the log of the terns of trade. The volatility measures
are calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of a variable for t, t- 1,  t-2 and t-3 to the average value for the same period. VREALXL is the volatility measure of the real
effective exchange  rate. VINFL is the volatility measure of the inflation rate.Table 2
Developing  Countries: Asymmetric  Effects  on Poverty
(OLS  with fixed  effects)
Dependent variable:  Log of headcount poverty index
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
INFL  0.213  0.178  0.203  0.231  0.186
(1.162)  (0.879)  (1.031)  (1.133)  (1.011)
ILLITY  -0.081  -0.105
(-0.726)  (-0.937)
LHOSPITAL  -0.697  -0.731  -0.894  -0.662  -0.710
(-2.075)  (-2.638)  (-3.842)  (-2.365)  (-2.137)
NEGREALGR  3.096  3.151  3.540  3.028  3.095
(2.082)  (2.091)  (2.509)  (2.069)  (2.153)
POSREALGR  0.620  0.953  0.763  0.899  0.635
(0.675)  (1.050)  (0.860)  (1.005)  (0.689)
NEGGDPPC  -0.873  -0.704  -0.634  -0.826  -0.818
(-1.904)  (-4.046)  (-3.856)  (-3.226)  (-1.838)
POSGDPPC  -0.894  -0.729  -0.656  -0.849  -0.840
(-1.965)  (-4.217)  (-4.045)  (-3.360)  (-1.899)
REALEX  -0.761  -0.837  -0.813  -0.822  -0.762
(-4.582)  (-6.032)  (-5.777)  (-6.191)  (-4.664)
OPEN  0.152  0.153
(1.030)  (1.025)
LURBAN  0.428  0.545
(0.436)  (0.566)
LTOT  -0.314  -0.237  -0.376  -0.187  -0.345
(-2.181)  (-1.392)  (-2.282)  (-1.027)  (-2.287)
VREALXL  1.532  1.681  1.714  1.567  1.596
(5.076)  (8.227)  (8.081)  (6.416)  (5.438)
Adj. R2  0.913  0.920  0.924  0.914  0.920
Number of obs.  74  75  75  74  75
Standard Error of  0.149  0.145  0.141  0.148  0.145
Regression
Note: INFL is the annual change  in the consumer price index.  ILLITY is the log of the illiteracy rate for the youth in
percent of total population.  LHOSPITAL  is the log of the number of beds per 1000 people. NEGREALGR
(POSREALGR)  is equal to I times the absolute value of REALGR (growth rate of GDP per capita)  when REALGR  is
negative (positive),  zero otherwise.  NEGGDPPC (POSGDPPC) is equal to I times GDPPC (level of GDP per capita)
when GDPPC  is lower (higher)  than GDPPC(-I),  zero otherwise. REALEX is the annual change in the real effective
exchange rate index (a rise is depreciation).  OPEN  is the log of the ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods
and services to GDP (all in nominal terms). LURBAN is the log of the urban population in percent of total population.
LTOT is the log of the terms of trade. The volatility  measures are calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of a
variable  for t, t-1, t-2 and t-3 to the average value for the same period. VREALXL  is the volatility measure of the real
effective  exchange rate.Table 3
Developing Countries:  Inequality and Asymmetric Effects on Poverty
(OLS with frixed effects)
Dependent variable: Log of headcount poverty index
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
INFL  0.382  0.397  0.379  0.386  0.346  0.284  0.278  0.149  0.109  0.064
(1.389)  (1.562)  (1.433)  (2.383)  (2.373)  (1.902)  (1.971)  (1.000)  (0.651)  (0.419)
ILLITY  -0.006  -0.203  -0.171  -0.282  -0.074
(-0044)  (-1.333)  (-1.214)  (-1.674)  (-0.536)
LHOSPITAL  -0.649  -0.784  -0.653  -0.547  -0.380  -0.508  -0.540  -0.627  -0.699
(-2.266)  (-2.145)  (-2.325)  (-1.668)  (-1.804)  (-2.377)  (-1.642)  (-2.142)  (-3.523)
GDPPC(-I)  -0.556  -0.455  -0.551  -0.929  -1.031  -1.101  -0.860
(-2.702)  (-1.431)  (-4.186)  (-2.712)  (4.157)  (-4.250)  (-5.562)
REALGR(-I)  -1.523  -1.681  -1.528  -1.700  -1.473  -1.276  -1.486
(-2.838)  (-2.431)  (-2.971)  (-2.787)  (-3.245)  (-2.918)  (-3.195)
NEGREALGR(-I)  3.797  3.713  5.046
(1.569)  (1.602)  (3.826)
POSREALGR(-I)  0.112  0.220  0.562
(0.106)  (0.194)  (0.957)
NEGGDPPC(-I)  -0.777  -0.669  -0.605
(-2.451)  (-4.024)  (-3.914)
POSGDPPC(-I)  -0.796  -0.692  -0.628
(-2.587)  (-4.333)  (-4.257)
REALEX  -0.227  -0.224  -0.227  -0.611  -0.629  -0.634  -0.662  -0.234  -0.223
(-2.229)  (-2.144)  (-2.245)  (-3.479)  (-4.027)  (-4.176)  (-4.105)  (-0.943)  (-0.888)
OPEN  0.042  0.020
(0.215)  (0.119)
LURBAN  -0.364  -0.502
(-0.423)  (-0.603)
LTOT  -0.152  -0.174  -0.154  -0.483  -0.467  -0.507  -0.497  -0.468  -0.505  -0.530
(-0.864)  (-0.902)  (-0.861)  (-3.075)  (-3.050)  (-3.118)  (-3.019)  (-2.157)  (-2.465)  (-3.792)
VREALXL  1.105  1.119  1.109  1.116  1.124  1.188  1.211  0.614  0.651  0.397
(3.702)  (3.662)  (3.724)  (4.240)  (4.448)  (4.609)  (4.605)  (1.154)  (1.306)  (1.299)
LGINI  1.182  1.125  1.194  0.908  0.939  0.845  0.854
(2.060)  (2.082)  (2.184)  (2.179)  (1.966)  (2.205)  (2.341)
Adj. R2  0.888  0.890  0.896  0.894  0.901  0.905  0.908  0.887  0.899  0.982
Number of obs.  74  75  75  64  64  66  65  64  65  65
StandardErrorof  0.170  0.170  0.165  0.165  0.159  0.158  0.156  0.171  0.163  0.151
Regression
INFL is the annual change in the consumer price index.  ILLITY is the log of the illiteracy rate for the youth in percent of total population.  LHOSPITAIL is the log of the number
of beds per 1000 people. GDPPC(-1)  is the lagged value of the log of the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity).  REALGR(-1)  is the lagged value of annual growth of GDP per
capita (purchasing power parity).  NEGREALGR(-1)  (POSREALGR(-1))  is equal to I times the absolute value of REALGR(-1)  when REALGR(-1)  is negative (positive),  zero
otherwise.  NEGGDPPC(-1)  (POSGDPPC(-1))  is equal to I times GDPPC(-1)  when GDPPC(- 1) is lower (higher ) than GDPPC(-2),  zero otherwise. REALEX is the annual
change in the real effective  exchange rate index (a rise is depreciation).  OPEN is the log of the ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and services to GDP (all in
nominal terms). LURBAN is the log of the urban population in percent of total population.  LTOT is the log of the terms of trade. The volatility measures are calculated as the ratio
of the standard deviation of a variable for t, t- I, t-2 and t-3 to the average value for the  same period. VREALXL  is the volatility measure  of the real effective  exchange rate. LGINI
is the log of Gini  index.Figure 1
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Developing Countries:  Growth and People in Absolute Poverty
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Developing Countries:  Growth and People in Relative Poverty
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are excluded from the Dollar-Kraay  sample).  The light-colored circles represent industrial countries.Figure  5
Gini Index and Inflation
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Source:  World  Bank and  International  Labor Organization.
Note: The list of the countries is Argentina  (1990-95),  Bangladesh (1993),  Benin (1992),  Bolivia (1990-96), Botswana
(1985,  1996), Brazil (1990-95), Cameroon  (1993),  Chile (1990-95,  1997), Colombia (1984,  1986,  1988,  1990-95), Costa
Rica (1990-95),  Cote d'lvoire  (1996), Ecuador (1990-97),  Ethiopia (1996), Gambia  (1992-93), Ghana  (1997),  Guatemala
(1987, 1989),  Honduras (1990-95),  India (1993),  Indonesia (1995),  Iran (1996),  Jamaica (1996),  Kenya (1992-95),
Madagascar  (1995), Mali (1989,  1996),  Mauritius (1992),  Mexico (1990-96),  Morocco (1988),  Niger (1995),  Pakistan
(1992), Panama  (1990-95),  Paraguay (1990-96), Peru  (1984,  1986-87,  1989-97),  Philippines (1988, 1995),  South
Africa(1995),  Sri Lanka  (1985), Tanzania (1990-91,  1995), Thailand (1988,  1990-95), Tunisia  (1981),  Uganda (1993-94),
Uruguay (1990-97), Venezuela (1990-97), Zambia  (1993).Figure 7
Developing Countries:  Informal  Sector Size and Tax Revenue
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